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Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Inadequate Basis for Health,
Safety, and Environmental
Regulatory Decisionmaking*
Michael S Baram**

INTRODUCTION

The use of cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking has
been hailed as the cure for numerous dissatisfactions with governmental regulation. Using this form of economic analysis arguably promotes
rational decisionmaking and prevents health, safety, and environmental regulations from having inflationary and other adverse economic
impacts. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the cost-benefit approach to regulatory decisionmaking suffers from major methodological limitations and institutional abuses. In practice, regulatory uses of
cost-benefit analysis stifle and obstruct the achievement of legislated
health, safety, and environmental goals.
This Article critically reviews the methodological limitations of
cost-benefit analysis, current agency uses of cost-benefit analysis under
statutory requirements, the impact of recent Executive orders mandating economic balancing analyses for all major regulatory agency decisions, and agency efforts to structure their discretion in the use of costbenefit analysis. The Article concludes that if the health, safety, and
environmental regulators continue to use cost-benefit analysis, proceCopyright © 1980 by Michael S. Baram.
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dural reforms are needed to promote greater accountability and public
participation in the decisionmaking process. Further, to the extent that
economic factors are permissible considerations under enabling statutes, agencies should conduct cost-effectiveness analysis, which aids in
determining the least costly means to designated goals, rather than
cost-benefit analysis, which improperly determines regulatory ends as
well as means.
I
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A MEANS TO STRUCTURE
AGENCY DISCRETION

A.

Delegation of Authority to Achieve Multiple Objectives

In response to increasing concerns about risks to health, safety,
and environmental quality, Congress has enacted several statutes' pro1. Health, safety, and environmental provisions requiring regulatory and public works
agencies to weigh multiple considerations before taking action include the following: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(bb) (West Supp. 1979)
(determination that a pesticide has "unreasonable adverse effects" takes into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of its use); Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (1976) (promulgation of safety rules requires consideration of the
risks of injury, number of products subject to the rule, public need for the product, probable
effect of the rule on utility, cost, and availability of the product, and means of minimizing
adverse effects on competition and manufacturing); id § 2076(m)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1979)
(product safety standards must take into account the cost impact on and benefit to consumers and affected businesses); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1976) (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator required to consider environmental,
economic, and social impact of actions); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1604(1) and 1606(d) (1976) (process must be devised to assess costs and benefits of
reforestation, timber stand improvement, and sale of timber); Soil and Water Resources
Conservation Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. § 2005(a)(7) (Supp. 1 1979) (development of conservation program shall analyze costs and benefits of alternatives); Clean Water Act § 303(c)(2),
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976) (establishment of state water quality standards requires consideration of public health and safety, the waters' value for public supply, fish and wildlife
propagation, and recreational, agricultural, industrial, and navigational uses); id
§ 304(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (determination of best practicable pollution control
measures must consider cost of technology, age of equipment and facilities, engineering aspects, and nonwater quality environmental impact); id § 315(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (National Study Commission to evaluate social, economic, and environmental effects of
achieving or not achieving effluent limitations); Water Resources Planning Act and Water
Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-2, 1962d-5e, 1962d-17 (1976) (congressional intent of assessing regional and national economic development and environmental protection in evaluating costs and benefits of water resource projects; establishment of
wetlands authorized if environmental, economic, and social benefits justify increased costs;
discount rate set for regional or river basin plans); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976) (all federal agencies required to give appropriate consideration to environmental values along with economic and technical factors);
Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5556(b)
(1976) (cost-benefit analysis required to demonstrate successful solar energy development
program); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5877(c) (1976) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) must state goals and priorities related to costs, benefits, and risks of
commercial nuclear power); Energy Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976,
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viding new schemes for agency decisionmaking. These statutes specify
the problems to be addressed and the procedures to be followed, but
provide little guidance on the analytical processes the federal agency
should use in reaching regulatory decisions.
The statutes typically prescribe a variety of general policy objectives, decisional criteria, and legislative findings to guide the agency in
dealing with the substantive aspects of its decisionmaking. These factors usually fall into two competing categories: (1) the reduction of
certain risks to health, safety, or environmental quality; and (2) the
minimization of adverse economic effects on regulated entities, their
employees, and consumers. In addition, an agency may be required to
consider using the best practicable or available technology to reduce
risks, promote energy conservation or national security, protect the
small business sector, or encourage innovation.
Agencies must also consider the additional, and often inconsistent,
objectives and requirements imposed by other statutes. 2 Operating
with limited resources and conflicting objectives, federal agencies must
therefore "make policy when Congress could make none" and afford
"a fair degree of predictability of decision in the great majority of cases
3
and of intelligibility in all."
The statutes are usually silent as to the analytical method by which
42 U.S.C. § 6839 (Supp. 1 1977) (energy conservation performance standards must take into
account efficiency, economic cost and benefit, and impacts upon affected groups); Clean Air
Act, § 109(d)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(C) (Supp. 1 1977) (scientific review committee to
advise EPA Administrator of advers'e public health, welfare, social, economic, and energy
effects of attainment strategies for ambient air quality standards); id § I lI(a)(1)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 741 (a)(l)(C) (existing source performance standards to be established with reference to best technological system, with consideration of cost, nonair quality health and environmental impacts, and energy requirements); id § 164(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b)(l)(A)
(description and analysis of health, environmental, economic, social, and energy effects required prior to air quality area redesignation); id § 202(a)(3)(A) (i), (iii), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (motor vehicle emission standards to be established by considering
cost, noise, energy, and safety effects of emission reduction); id § 21 l(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7545(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1979) (cost-benefit analysis required for emission control devices before control or prohibition of certain fuels or fuel additives).
2. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING
CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 17-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CHEMICALS REPORT].
3. Friendly, The FederalAdministrative Agencies.- The Needfor a Better Definition of
Standards,75 HARV. L. REV. 873, 874 (1962). Although structuring discretion to accommodate multiple considerations in decisionmaking has not received sufficient congressional attention, there are recent indications of congressional concern over excessive delegation. See
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION (Comm. Print 1977), which recommends, in part: "The mandates of the

independent regulatory agencies should be drafted by Congress in as narrow and specific a
manner as possible. Where broad delegations of authority are determined by Congress to be
unavoidable, congressional oversight of subsequent agency action should be significantly
increased." id at X1I1. See also letter from Senator Edmund Muskie to Comptroller General Elmer Staats (Aug. 5, 197-7), reprintedin GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED
FORMULATION AND PRESENTATION OF WATER RESOURCES PROJECT ALTERNATIVES PROVIDE A BASIS FOR BETTER MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 18 (Feb. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
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the agency must balance these diverse factors. At most, Congress occa4
sionally specifies that certain factors are subordinate to others. As a
result, Congress delegates considerable discretion to the agency to
balancing of
structure the central feature of its decisionmaking-the
5
decision.
a
reach
to
necessary
multiple objectives
Judicial review of agency action ensures compliance with express
or implied sfatutory balancing requirements. According to the District
of Columbia Circuit, for example, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) 6 requires agencies to use a "case by case balancing
judgment" in which "the particular economic and technical benefits of
planned action must be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs." '7 This court also construed the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 8 a statute generally assumed to promote the single objective of
9
public health, to require a balancing of multiple considerations.
Muskie letter to GAO] (requesting a report describing how the Corps of Engineers and other
water resource agencies limit their discretion in decisionmaking).
Economists, engineers, and other analysts of public sector decisionmaking are addressing the multiple objective problem. See R. KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADE-OFFS (1976); E. STOKEY & R.
PLE OBJECTIVES:
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978) [hereinafter cited as STOKEY &
ZECKHAUSER].

4. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 317(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7617(e) (1976) (consideration of economic effects does not lessen the Administrator's duty to protect public health and welfare).
5. Judge Bazelon has observed:
Traditionally, in democratic societies, it is elected legislatures that make the hard
value choices. Indeed, this is precisely what legislatures are designed to do. Increasingly, however, our legislatures have been delegating these value choices to
administrative agencies-institutions which cannot resolve value conflicts through
the relatively simple expedient of a show of hands.
D. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process 12 (Jan. 10, 1977) (paper
presented at Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Conference on United States Energy Policy,
Washington, D.C.). See also Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs, Review of Decision Methodologies for Evaluating Regulatory Actions Affecting Public Health and Safety (Dec. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Battelle Report]. The report states:
The most significant feature of the legal setting for health and safety regulations is
that both Congress and the courts give the agencies broad discretion in making
decisions. With few exceptions . . . , Congress has simply told the agencies to
protect public health and safety and has not indicated guidelines for acceptable
incremental safety expenditures or ways to determine an acceptable approach.
Id.at ix. See also CHEMICALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11-22.
6. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4368 (West Supp. 1979).
7. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-10 (West Supp. 1974-1978).
9. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court
observed:
The task of the agency here is largely one of line drawing. Agency expertise and
judgment must be applied in determining the optimal balance between promotion
of the public welfare and avoidance of unnecessary expense. [The court] will not
interfere so long as the agency strikes a balance that reasonable [sic] promotes the
legislative purpose.
Id at 346.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit construed the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
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There is, however, no consensus as to how courts should review
agency balancing. Judge Leventhal believed that the judiciary should
play a central role in "ensuring the principled integration and balanced
assessment of environmental and nonenvironmental considerations in
federal agency decisionmaking."' 0
[T]o the extent that special knowledge [is] involved, it [is] the knowledge of how matters are proven, and that is a field in which courts have
always had a special interest and in which they cannot escape keeping
up with the scientific times. . . . There may be recondite problems on
the frontier of statistical and probability theory that a court cannot
meaningfully handle. Basically, however, a court can, by diligence and
attentiveness, address itself to issues of how matters are proven, even
though understanding such issues may involve some inkling of statistical significance. "
In contrast to Judge Leventhal's urging that courts evaluate the
substantive and analytical aspects of agency decisionmaking, Judge
Bazelon concludes that courts should defer to the scientific and technological determinations and value preferences of the agencies. Instead,
"the important thing is that the agency generate a record in which the
factual issues are fully developed" in order to "make possible effective
12
professional peer review, as well as legislative and public oversight."'
As a result of these statutory and judicial attitudes about balancing, regulatory agencies have sought to develop new techniques for
structuring their discretion. Most of these techniques are variations on
the theme of cost-benefit analysis.
B.

Use of Cost-Beneft Analysis

1. Defining Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis derives from simple profit and loss accounting traditionally practiced by business organizations. 13 Cost-benefit
analysis
involves translating the attribute performances of alternatives into dollar quantities. The favorable attribute performances are added toU.S.C. § 652(8) (1976), to require that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) justify its workplace health standard for benzene by demonstrating a reasonable
relationship between the quantified costs and benefits of the proposed regulation. American
Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. grantedsub. nom.
Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute, 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
10. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509, 555 (1974).

11. Id at 533.
12. D. Bazelon, supra note 5, at 8. But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), in which the Supreme Court
limited the authority of federal courts to require procedures beyond those provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-700 (1976). See note 22 infra.
13. See E.J. MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6 (1973).
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gether to become the benefits. The sum of the unfavorable attribute
performances is the cost. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis can be viewed
as a process of deriving dollar values for each entry in a performance
eimatrix and aggregating all of the performances into one attribute,
4
ther net benefits (benefit minus cost) or a benefit to cost ratio.'
A decision is justifiable when net benefit is positive or a benefit-to-cost
ratio is greater than one.
Policy analysts have broadened the meaning of cost-benefit analysis to encompass virtually any analytical method that organizes information on alternative courses of action or displays possible trade-off

opportunities, thereby structuring decisionmaking. 15 Thus, the costbenefit rubric encompasses many different types of analyses. Some of

these analyses simply adopt a previously determined objective, leaving
only the "cost" side of the balance sheet to be developed. For example,
in establishing an emission standard for the discharge of ionizing radiation from a nuclear reactor, an analyst may be "given" a preexisting
standard for the ambient level of radiation necessary to protect human
health near the reactor. This standard represents a conclusive determination of the degree of societal benefit to be achieved and reduces the
analyst's task to finding the most cost-effective method to meet the ambient standard. Hence, the analysis in this truncated format is a simpler task of cost-effectiveness analysis. Cost-benefit analysis, then, is
used by the decisionmaker to establish societal goals as well as the

means for achieving these goals, whereas cost-effectiveness analysis only
compares alternative means for achieving "given" goals. 16 This Article
focuses on cost-benefit analysis.
14. Battelle Report, supra note 5, at 53. See also STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note
3, at 136-37.
15.

See CHEMICALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 39:

Benefit-cost analysis. . . is not a rule or formula which would make the decision
or predetermine the choice for the decision maker. Rather, it refers to the systematic analysis and evaluation of alternative courses of action drawing upon the analytical tools and insights provided by economics and decision theory. It is a
framework and a set of procedures to help organize the available information, display trade-offs, and point out uncertainties ...
Cost-benefit analysis is thought to simplify decisions "by reducing the relevant factors to
numbers that can be added, subtracted and compared. The only unit generally considered
feasible for doing this is the dollar, but the use of dollar values poses a great many
problems." Id at 41. See also Battelle Report, supra note 5; W. ROWE, AN ANATOMY OF
RISK (1975); and E.J. MISHAN, supra note 13. For a lucid review of 16 techniques for analyzing and improving systems frequently used in the data and organization stages of costbenefit analysis, see A.L. McCauley, Statistics-Based Systems Techniques: Concepts, Examples, Applications (Feb. 16, 1972) (IBM Data Processing Technical Publication).
16. See discussion of this distinction in Baram, Legal and InstitutionalAspectsof Using
Bene&t-Cost Analysis to ControlIonizing Radiation, in CONSIDERATIONS OF HEALTH BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSURE AND AL-

107-12 (1977) (EPA Rep. No. 520/4-77-003) [hereinafter cited as RADIATION
REPORT]. See also Weinberg, Benefit-Cost Analysis andthe Linear Hypothesis, 271 NATURE
TERNATIVES

596 (1978).

1980]

COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS

2. Adoption of Cost-Beneft Analysis by FederalAgencies
The continuing efforts of regulatory agencies to balance competing
considerations, 17 such as public health and economic feasibility, are beset by a number of special problems. The technical problems include
an ever-expanding, but limited and generally inconclusive data base,' 8
disagreement among experts on methods for using data, lack of consen-

sus as to findings and their applicability to problems at hand, and unquantifiable attributes. Regulators must also value low probability,
high cost events while taking into consideration the diverse and chang-

ing values of our pluralistic society. 19 Moreover, an atmosphere of
"crisis management" is promoted by statutory time limitations and
pressures from various interests.
Mandated by statutes20 and recent Executive orders2 1 to conduct
complex "balancing analyses" to reach decisions, regulatory agencies
are under considerable pressure to adopt cost-benefit analysis. 22 The

17. Public works agencies have used cost-benefit analysis since the late 19th century.
M. Baram, Federal Energy Regulation and the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal and
Public Policy Considerations 1-8 (Oct. 1, 1977) (Report to Environmental Policy Office,
Brookhaven National Laboratory) [hereinafter cited as Brookhaven Report]; J. Tarr & F.
McMichael, The Evolution of Wastewater Technology and the Development of State Regulation." A Retrospective Analysis in RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT-1976, at 165

(J. Tarr ed. 1977). Congress specifically approved the technique in water resource development projects in 1936 (Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-709(a) (West Supp.
1979)), and most federal public works agencies adopted cost-benefit analysis soon afterward.
This early use of cost-benefit analysis by public works agencies was deficient in several respects. For example, the agencies failed to consider environmental costs and applied inadequately low interest rates to discount future benefits and costs to present values. See
Roberts, Benefit- Cost Ana sis." Its Use (Misuse) in Evaluating Water Resource Projects, 14
AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 81-83 (1976); R. Mikesell, The Rate of Discount for Evaluating Public
Projects (1977) (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research); and U. Kim, A
Benefit-Cost Approach to Water Resource Investments: Theory and Its Application (Sept.
1977) (unpublished paper, Dep't of Economics and Business Management, Cath. U., Washington, D.C.). The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4368 (West Supp. 1979), and an increased discount rate have partially
alleviated this problem. See Roberts, supra. See also U.S. Comptroller General, Survey of
Use by Federal Agencies of the Discounting Technique in Evaluating Future Programs
(Jan. 28, 1968) (Report to the Joint Economic Committee).
18. See, e.g., Chalfant, Hartmann & Blakeboro, Recombinant DNA. A Case Study in
Regulation of Scientfic Research, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Recombinant DNA]. For background on decisionmaking from an uncertain data base, see W.
LOWRENCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK (1976), Battelle Report, supra note 5, and CHEMICALS
REPORT, supra note 2.

19. For a more detailed description of problems associated with societal values, such as
public preference for voluntary over involuntary risks, see Recombinant DNA, supra note 18,
at 59-60, 81-83.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Compilation), amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017 (1976); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978
Compilation).
22. However, the courts have given the regulatory agencies a relatively free hand to
establish procedures for conducting cost-benefit analysis. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear
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use of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decision processes has been
promoted by economic consultants and advisory committees to the
agencies drawn from the scientific and engineering communities, including the National Academy of Sciences. 23 In addition, regulated industries have urged agencies to use cost-benefit analysis in considering
the economic impacts of regulations. Their efforts include challenging
agency actions not premised on cost-benefit analysis in lawsuits, lobbying for amendments to existing statutes to require agencies to engage in
cost-benefit analysis, conducting studies demonstrating the inflationary
and other adverse economic effects of agency decisionmaking not premised on cost-benefit analysis, and advertising campaigns against regulation conducted without cost-benefit analysis. 24 The public also has
become increasingly critical of regulation as a cause of societal and economic ills.25 In response to these demands for reform, Presidents
Ford and Carter issued several Executive orders requiring agencies to
conduct "inflationary impact analyses" and other regulatory analyses
of a monetary or economic nature in their major rulemaking activi26
ties.
The increasing pressure upon agencies to use cost-benefit analysis
raises a variety of methodological, legal, and public policy issues:
quantification of hitherto unquantifiable factors, such as aesthetics,
ecological change, and human mortality; the proper degree of congressional, judicial, and public deference to agency decisions; the choice of
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In that case,
the NRDC challenged an AEC rulemaking procedure dealing with spent fuel from a reactor
and the use of the rule in cost-benefit analysis for licensing Vermont Yankee's light water
reactor. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals overturned the rulemaking because of
the AEC's failure to employ certain procedural devices beyond the statutory minima. The
Supreme Court held that the circuit court had improperly intruded into the AEC's rulemaking authority and remanded the case.
23. See, e.g., CHEMICALS REPORT, .,pra note 2; L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION
AND HUMAN HEALTH, 209-51 (1977); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISIONMAKING
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1977); RADIATION REPORT, supra note 16;
Kletz, What Risks Should We Run?, 74 NEW SCIENTIST 320 (1977); Oi, Safety at An) Price,
REGULATION 16 (Nov./Dec. 1977); Comments of Paul W. MacAvoy, Government Regulation: Where Do We Go From Here? (Dec. 19, 1977) (Round table discussion sponsored by
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
24. See, e.g., Mobil Oil's five-part series on "The Capitalist Revolution" culminating in
"A Proposal for Change," which calls for "[a] requirement that clear and unbiased Economic Impact Statements-spelling out their effects on jobs, costs, inflation and the national
economy-accompany all new major regulations and legislation." N.Y. Times, July 27,
1978, § A, at 19.
25. A public survey by the National Science Foundation indicates that the public overwhelmingly believes governmental decisionmakers are most at fault when science and technology cause problems. Sixty percent of those surveyed attributed such problems to
governmental decisionmakers, only 14% to business decisionmakers, and 12% to the scientific and engineering communities. National Science Board, National Science Foundation,
Science Indicators 1976 (1977).
26. See note 21 supra.
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discount rates for dealing with future social costs and benefits; constitutional requirements for separation of powers, due process, and equal
protection; and potential conflicts between highly specific Executive orders and general statutory requirements. The following sections address the major methodological problems and limitations inherent in
cost-benefit analysis, several agencies' experience with cost-benefit
analysis, and suggestions for dealing with specific problems.
II
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN REGULATORY USES OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS

Many studies have identified the methodological limitations in the
use of cost-benefit analysis as a basis for governmental decisionmaking. 27 Nevertheless, regulatory agencies continue to use cost-benefit
analysis on many questions that present significant difficulties. The
problems discussed in this section are not uniquely attributable to the
analytical restraints of cost-benefit analysis, but stem from estimates
based on scanty technical facts and the consideration of diverse values.
Furthermore, many of the cost-benefit analysis problems are fundamental problems of the regulatory process itself, including good faith
objectivity, effective citizen participation, and agency accountability.
Other problems arise from unresolved constitutional problems, including the congressional delegation of broad and unguided authority to
agencies and presidential intervention to promote consideration of economic factors conflicting with statutory requirements that stress health,
safety, or environmental considerations. The following discussion
briefly inventories methodological issues 28 raised by the use of cost27.

The literature on cost-benefit analysis is curious in that a typical article will can-

didly treat the limitations of cost-benefit analysis and warn against overreliance upon its use,
but thereafter describe its possible use in a particular situation and finally urge adoption of
the results. See, for example, the cautionary beginnings, ambiguous discussion, earnest application, and upbeat conclusions on cost-benefit analysis in the National Academy of Sciences reports cited in notes 2 & 23 supra.
In addition to the works cited in notes 5, 13, & 23, supra, useful background informa-

tion is provided by reviewing the following congressional committee studies and reports:
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FAST BREEDER REACTOR DECISION: AN
ANALYSIS OF LIMITS AND THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 1976); SUBCOMM. ON
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,
94TH CONG., 2d. SESS., PROCEEDINGS OF A CONGRESSIONAL SEMINAR ON Low-LEVEL IONIZING RADIATION (Comm. Print 1976); SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM (Comm. Print 1976).

28. This Article does not address the theoretical problems underlying cost-benefit analysis. For instance, not every economically efficient policy, one whose benefits exceed its
costs, will increase overall social welfare if economic inefficiencies exist in other sectors of
the economy. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11-32 (1956-57).
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benefit analysis in regulatory agency decisionmaking. 29
A.

Inadequate Identflcation of Costs and Benefits of ProposedAction

One of the first steps in cost-benefit analysis is identifying the implications of regulatory options. Forecasting techniques notoriously
fail to identify the possible primary, secondary, and tertiary consequences of a proposed action-particularly if that action sets a standard with diffuse health or environmental consequences that extend
geographically and temporally. For example, analysts have great difficulty estimating the specific social and economic costs and benefits of
regulatory options for controlling carcinogens. 30 Cost-benefit analysis
"offers no protection against historically bad assumptions ...
[Fjoolproof techniques for forecasting unforeseen consequences are by
31
definition nonexistent."
The problem of inadequate or impossible measurement of attributes is related to the deficiencies of forecasting techniques. For instance, the "skimpy science" of toxicity is an acknowledged problem
for regulatory officials seeking to measure costs and benefits of possible
regulatory options for the control of toxic substances. 32 Without the
knowledge, techniques, trained personnel, and funds to measure these
factors adequately, gross error in estimation may result. Similarly,
many environmental effects, such as changes in ecosystems, cannot be
29. For further information on the methodological problems of cost-benefit analysis,
see publications cited in notes 2, 5, 13, & 23 supra. The author has written extensively on
many of these problems. See Brookhaven Report, supra note 17, at 1-8; RADIATION REPORT, supra note 16; Baram, An Assessment of the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory
Agency Decision Making, in RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT-1976, at 15 (J.
Tarr ed. 1977); Baram, Radiationfrom Nuclear Power Plants: The Needfor Congressional
Directives, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 905 (1977); Baram, Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens.
Why Cost-Benefit Analysis May Be Harmful to Your Health, 78 TECH. REV. 41 (1976); Symposium: Risk-Benefit Assessment in Governmental Decision Making, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
901 (1977).
30. See D. Rice & T. Hodgson, Social and Economic Implications of Cancer in the
United States (June 1978) (report presented by statisticians and economists at the National
Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health Education and Welfare to Expert Committee on Cancer Statistics of the World Health Organization and the International Agency for
Research on Cancer at Madrid, Spain) [hereinafter cited as Rice and Hodgson]. This paper
raises numerous questions about the application of cost-benefit analysis to the regulation of
carcinogens, including whether the economic benefits of regulating a carcinogen include
reducing the need for extra household help and special diets for patients, transportation
costs for receiving medical treatment, and losses to patients that otherwise would occur in
the form of reduced capital gains arising from their forced sale of assets. The report also
questions whether analysis should include anxieties, personality changes, reduced sexual
functions, and other social costs. Indeed, the lengthy report raises so many types of costs
and benefits that it is doubtful whether any agency would have the resources to undertake
the analysis.
31. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 3, at 148-49.
32. Interview with Steven Jellineck, Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 1978).
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estimated with confidence because no acceptable method exists to
33
measure these attributes.
Furthermore, characterization of attributes may be problematic.
An attribute deemed a benefit by an agency official may pose the problem of beneficiaries who do not desire the benefit or who do not even
consider the attribute to be a benefit. For example, "cheap energy" is
normally characterized as a benefit in a proceeding considering the
construction of an energy facility. It may, however, be immaterial to
those who have enough energy, or may be viewed as a cost to propo34
nents of resource conservation.
Even if costs and benefits are identified, they may not be included
in subsequent analysis for pragmatic reasons. Attributes may be too
costly or too complex to measure. Exclusion may be based on a tenuous causal connection between the planned action and the possible attribute, as with the predicted probabilities of secondary or tertiary
effects of a proposed agency action. Identified attributes also may be
excluded for self-serving reasons. For example, if consideration of a
possible disastrous consequence of a regulatory decision would tilt the
outcome of the analysis against a favored agency action, it might be
35
omitted from the final balancing process.
B.

Quantifying the Value of Human Life and Other Traditional'y
UnquantflableAttributes

Cost-benefit analysis works best when (1) a socially accepted
method, such as market pricing, is available to measure the costs and
benefits, and (2) the measurement can be expressed in dollars or some
other commensurable unit. Regulatory agencies using cost-benefit
analysis face a critical problem when confronted with attributes that
36
defy traditional economic valuation.
Analysts are well aware of these problems. Some refrain from
placing their own values on immeasurable attributes and redirect their
33. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND REGULATORY REFORM 515 (Comm. Print 1976), which concludes that inability to
measure some attributes accurately militates against certain uses of cost-benefit analysis.
34. See further discussion of the often ambiguous character of attributes included in
cost-benefit analysis in Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 911 (1977). Lovins entertainingly describes how different values lead to

different characterizations of an attribute: "Is an artful new kind of synthetic desert a benefit
or a disgrace?" Id at 914.
35. See Mark & Stuart-Alexander, Disastersas a Necessary PartofBenefit-Cost Analyses, 197 Sci. 1160 (1977).

36.

The implications of DNA experimentation present a striking example of intangible

decisional critiera that raise critical cost-benefit valuation problems. See generally Recombinant DNA, supra note 18.

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:473

analyses. 37 More typically, analysts recommend cautious use of costbenefit analysis. 38 Inconclusive analyses of valuation difficulties in
cost-benefit literature reflect the hope that the problem will fade or be
forgotten. For instance, although Stokey and Zeckhauser maintain
that the complexity and importance of measuring intangible costs and
benefits should not be underestimated, they ultimately conclude that
perhaps quantification should be consciously postponed.
In some cases, it may be best to avoid quantifying some intangibles as
long as possible, carrying them along instead in the form of a written
paragraph of description. Maybe we will find that the intangible considerations point toward the same decision as the more easily quantified attributes. Maybe one or a few of them can be adequately handled
by a decision-maker without resort to quantification. We will find no
escape from the numbers. .

.

. Ultimately the final decision will im-

plicitly quantify a host of intangibles; there39are no incommensurables
when decisions are made in the real world.
This use of cost-benefit analysis is morally and intellectually irresponsible.
37. In evaluating control options for sulfur dioxide air pollution from stationary
sources, Dr. Granger Morgan asserts:
There is no way that I can put a dollar value on this case. That would require me
to place a dollar value on human life, and no reasonable person is prepared to do
that. But I might reasonably ask how much money society is prepared to invest in
order to statistically prevent one additional air pollution related death.
G. Morgan, Technical Uncertainty in the Policy-Making Process 18 (Oct. 25, 1977) (paper
presented at Sixth Annual Conference of Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality).
38. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Principles of Decision-Making
for Regulating Chemicals in the Environment notes: "Different individuals place different
values on things such as human life, aesthetics, or national security. Thus an analysis that
assigns a quantitative value to. . . these factors is necessarily subjective and, to some degree
arbitrary." CHEMICALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. The Committee notes that even where
the analyst refrains from placing a dollar value on human life, a particular decision reflects
an implicit valuation of life. Nevertheless, the Committee concludes that compared to other
methods, cost-benefit analysis represents a significant advance and recommends its own version, called "Hazard-Cost-Benefit Comparison." Id at 39-50.
39. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 3, at 153. Others have responded to the problem of valuation as an opportunity to exhibit their statistical finesse. For example, Walter
Oi has undertaken to determine the price'society is willing to pay for more safety.
The situation becomes a bit more complicated when the accidents involve truly
nontraded goods like lives and limbs. Even here, market prices can be used to
infer some implicit valuations of the contingent accident costs. Using data on wage
differentials, Thaler and Rosen found that workers behaved as if they attached a
value to life of $160,000 to $260,000. Robert S. Smith, using a slightly different
body of data, came up with considerably higher implicit values of up to $1.5 million for a life. Some variations ought to be expected because human lives are not
homogenous goods like bags of No. 2 wheat.
Oi, supra note 23, at 19.
Oi concludes that "[s]afety and health are important economic issues," and that
"[w]hether it is direct or indirect, stated or implicit, there is always a 'price' for reducing
illness and accidents." Id at 23. This intolerance of the experts for intangibles-for matters
not expressed in dollars or other economic units of value-and this limited perspective on
health, safety, and the environment pervades the cost-benefit analysis literature and has influenced agency users of cost-benefit analysis.
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Today, a number of agencies assign monetary values to human
life. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses a value of
$1,000 per whole-body rem in its cost-benefit analysis. 40 This figure,
multiplied by the number of rems capable of producing different types
of deaths, provides dollar values for human life. The Environmental
Protection Agency's Office of Radiation Programs establishes its environmental radiation standards at levels that will not cost more than
$500,000 for each life to be saved. 4 1 The Consumer Product Safety
Commission uses values ranging from $200,000 to $2,000,000 per life in
42
its analyses.
But the fundamental issue is whether cost-benefit analysis is appropriate at all. Without an answer to this question from Congress or
the courts, consideration turns to lesser issues: the proper method of
valuation,4 3 the substantive basis for valuation (possibly relying on insurance statistics, jury awards, or potential lifetime earnings), and the
40. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 app. 1 (1979).
41. Interview with Dr. William Rowe, Chief Radiation Program Office, EPA, in Washington, D.C. (1977). Dr. Rowe stated that EPA would not propose a radiation standard for
the uranium fuel cycle that would cost more than $500,000 to save an additional, unspecified
human life in the general population; it would save a life if the cost were less than $100,000.
For costs in between, EPA makes an ad hoc determination.
42. See B. Shimmei, Consumer Product Safety Commission: Risk Management Regulation and the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis (May 1978) (unpublished draft for M. Baram
project on Federal Regulation and Risk Management, based in part on extensive interviews
with CPSC personnel). For an extensive Department of Transportation report setting values
for human life, see NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, SOCIETAL COSTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS (Dec. 1976). This

work and its periodic revisions are frequently consulted and cited with respect to monetary
valuation of human life and health. The National Bureau of Standards, in its studies to find
technical solutions to problems of flammable fabrics and other consumer hazards for regulatory agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), has used a value of
$300,000 per life in arriving at its recommendations. See U.S. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING UPHOL-

STERED FURNITURE FIRE LOSSES 13 (Nov. 1977) (NBSIR-77-1381).
43. Consider the approach adopted by statisticians and economists at the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare in their reports on the cancer data base available for use
by regulatory agencies:
One, if not the chief, issue with respect to indirect costs is how to value human life.
The method in this report is referred to as the "human capital" approach because it
views an employed person as producing a stream of output over the years that is
valued at the individual's earnings. The main criticism of this methodology is that
it excludes intangibles, only counting earnings, and under-values some groups relative to others because earnings may not reflect one's ability to produce. Thus, men
are more highly valued than women, whites more than blacks, and the middleaged more than the young and elderly. ...
An alternative approach favored by some is that of "willingness to pay." This
method values human life according to the amount people are willing to spend to
obtain reductions in the probability of death. Objections to this are that the value
of individual lives depends on the income distribution, with the rich able to pay
more than the poor, and that it is exceedingly difficult for persons to place a value
on small reductions in the probability of death.
Rice & Hodgson, supra note 30, at 18-19.
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extent agencies should articulate these issues and provide procedures
for participation in the valuation process.
To date, agencies have expressed surprisingly little concern about
these unresolved problems associated with cost-benefit analysis. 44 Although officials deny valuing unquantifiable factors, 45 these valuations
are implicit in any cost-benefit based policy decision involving risks to
human life. Responsible decisionmaking demands that implicit valuations be acknowledged and addressed explicitly.
C. The Chronic Problem of the Discount Ratefor Valuing Future
Benefits and Costs in Present Analyses
The discount rate is yet another controversial issue afflicting costbenefit analysis. Stokey and Zeckhauser note that "no observed rate of
return can provide an accurate reading of the intertemporal preferences
of the society as a whole. . . . [T]he choice of a discount rate should be
used deliberately to apportion costs and benefits among income groups
and. . . generations, according to the values held by society."' 46 Congress and the courts, however, have not decided upon a standard discount rate to establish the present value for future dollar levels of
predicted attributes, such as future ecological dislocation, mutagenic effects on future generations, and other long-term consequences of actions taken by regulatory agencies.
Absent a societal decision on the appropriate discount rate, the
task of establishing a present value for the future effects of agency decisions falls upon the individual analyst. This has resulted in arbitrary,
47
inconsistent determinations in many cost-benefit analysis decisions.
44. For a rare exception and candid expression of concern, see W. Prunella, A Qualitative Assessment of Cost-Benefit Analysis and its Application in the Area of Product Safety
3-4 (undated draft received Feb. 1978 from Economic Program Analysis Division, Consumer Product Safety Commission):
No accepted monetary figures for the value of life exist; nor should we expect them

to exist. . . .[F]actors such as age or occupation will influence the money value
placed on costs incurred. . . .[I1f children and the poor are victims, remedial action may not seem justified from the calculation of cost-benefit ratios, when at the
same time, if the victims had been of a different age or income level, action would

be more readily supportable.
45. Steven Jellineck, Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, declared at a meeting of the Administrator's Advisory Committee on
Toxic Substances, Nov. 1977 that his division was not going to put a dollar value on life. In
light of the statutory requirements of § 6(c) of the Toxics Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2605(c) (Supp. 1 1977), however, it appears that some form of cost-benefit analysis will be
adopted to regulate toxic substances. See discussion of EPA in part III of this Article.
46. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 3, at 173. See R. Campbell, Food Safety Regulation 19 (AEI-Hoover Study 12, Aug. 1974).
47. Indeed, analysts have chosen rates that tend to confirm the outcomes they desire.

Critics have attacked the use of self-serving and essentially arbitrary discount rates in the
water resource projects of developer agencies such as the Corps of Engineers. The use of
low discount rates, such as 2.63% in the 1950's and 1960's provided higher values for the
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For instance, agency analysts have not agreed on a discount rate for the
long-term carcinogenic and mutagenic effects of radioactive isotopes
and toxic chemicals. Suggested rates for the future costs of cancer and
other diseases range from six to ten percent, without any notable underlying rationale.4 8 Analysts seem to be feeling their way toward
some sign of societal acquiescence on a discount rate for long-term
49
health and environmental attributes.
But focusing on the search for the societally acceptable number for
discounting the future clouds the larger issue: whether using these economic principles in contemporary decisionmaking adequately 50ensures
Ultithe desirable quality of life and health for future generations.
mately, the discount rate issue is an ethical problem that transcends
economic and legal perspectives."
D. Improper Distributionof Costs and Benefits
Every regulatory decision on health, safety, or environmental
problems results in costs and benefits that will be distributed in some
pattern across different population sectors, and in many cases, over several generations. For example, a decision to allow the commercial distribution of a toxic substance may result in economic benefits to the
industrial users, their shareholders and employees, and consumers. It
may also result, however, in adverse health effects and property damage to plant employees and those living near the plant. In addition,
future generations may suffer mutagenic health effects or the depletion
or pollution of natural resources.
estimated future benefits of planned projects to Corps analysts, resulting in positive costbenefit analysis ratios and favorable decisions on water resource projects. These low rates
were below the yield on long-term governmental securities and Treasury issues. The debate
over an appropriate discount rate for water resources projects continues today, as evidenced
by President Carter's objections to proposed projects based upon a 6.38% discount rate. R.
Mikesell, The Rate of Discount for Evaluating Public Projects 3-5 (AEI Studies 184, 1977).
For detailed background, see U. Kim, A Benefit-Cost Approach to Water Resource Investments: Theory and Its Application (unpublished paper, Dep't of Economics and Business
Management, Cath. U., Washington, D.C.).
48. Rice & Hodgson, supra note 30, at 13.
49. For further discussion of the arbitrary choice of discount rates, see W. Prunella,
supra note 44, at 4.
50. If the discount rate were 5 percent . . . I case [of poisoning by chemicals]
today would be valued the same as 1730 cases occuring in 200 years, or the same as
the current world population (more than 3 billion cases) in 450 years. Clearly,
intergenerational effects of these magnitudes are ethically unacceptable, yet they
might be made to appear acceptable if the traditional social rate of discount concept were applied. There is as yet no generally accepted method for weighting the
intergenerational incidence of benefits and costs.
CHEMICALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
51. For a brief expression of this concern by the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, see RADIATION REPORT, supra note
16, at 68-70.
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Analysts and decisionmakers using cost-benefit analysis recognize
these implications. Nonetheless, in the absence of public policy directives, analysts frequently apply personal assumptions about the allocation of costs and benefits while calling for objective "fairness" in
dealing with distributional problems.5 2 Thus according to Stokey and
Zeckhauser:
1. A program should be adopted when it will yield benefits to one
group that are greater than the losses of another group, provided
that the two groups are in roughly equivalent circumstances and
the changes in welfare are not of great magnitude ...
2. If the benefits of a proposed policy are greater for one group than
the costs for another group, and if it redresses the discriminatory
effects of earlier policy choices, that policy should be undertaken ...
3. It is not so clear whether policies should be undertaken if they will
benefit some groups only by imposing significant costs on others. It
is sometimes proposed that a policy change should be adopted if
and only if it passes a two-part test: (a) it yields positive net benefits, and (b) the redistributional effects of the change are beneficial. ....53
Such earnest analytical approaches to determining fair distributions of costs and benefits 54 ignore constitutional precepts underlying
public sector decisionmaking. Constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, property rights, and representative government
should carry greater weight in solving the distributional problem than
assumptions about fairness developed by economists and analysts.
Issues of temporal distribution, involving the allocation of costs
and benefits for future generations, transcend even these constitutional
values. Future generations possess neither present interests nor designated representatives to advance those interests. Our laws and values
favor current benefits to those that accrue later. Cost-benefit analysis
also reflects a preference for current benefits over future ones.5 5 Distri52.
53.

See Lucas, Dividing Up the Pie, 13 ENGINEERING: CORNELL Q. 17 (1978).
STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 3, at 281-82. See also the assumptions in D.

HARRISON, WHO PAYS FOR CLEAN AIR 127-34 (1975).

54.

Cost-benefit analysis practitioners often obscure the distributional effects on spe-

cific population sectors in reaching "societally optimal" decisions. Environmental Impact
Statements of NRC, for example, usually state that no undue distribution of costs and bene-

fits will occur from a proposed power plant. But the underlying health effects analyses reveal that the most harmful exposures to ionizing radiation occur in the plant environs,
whereas most of the benefits from the energy will be distributed in a broader geographic
region. See Brookhaven Report, supra note 17, at 75-134.
55. The choice of a particular discount rate can make long-term costs and benefits virtually irrelevant to the decisionmaking process. For example, at a discount rate of 10% per
year, the present value of one dollar's worth of benefit or cost received 10 years in the future
is only 39 cents, received in 20 years its present value is only 15 cents, in 30 years, six cents.
L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, Table A-1 at
128 (1977).
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bution over time, therefore, like the discount rate, is essentially an ethical issue for the nation. The assumptions that analysts must make
about temporal distributions in using cost-benefit analysis are inade56
quate precisely because analysts, and not society, have made them.
E

Promoting Self-Interest and Other Analytical Temptations

Users of cost-benefit analysis can easily play a "numbers game" to
arrive at decisions that promote or justify agency actions reached on
other grounds.5 7 The purportedly objective framework of cost-benefit
analysis can be used to promote rather than to analyze options by
manipulating the discount rate, assigning arbitrary values to identified
costs and benefits, excluding costs that would tilt the outcome against
the preferred option, and using self-serving assumptions about distributional fairness. Indeed, the very use of cost-benefit analysis leads some
observers to conclude that the action under consideration is scheduled
for approval.5 8 Even self-corrective measures are suspect. For example, the use of safety factors 59 ostensibly chosen to avoid certain effects
may prove to be a facile solution that does not alter the preferred analytical result if these factors are determined only after completing a
preliminary analysis. Furthermore, these factors are usually based on
56.

For futher discussion, see

BREEDER REACTOR DECISION:

JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FAST
AN ANALYSIS OF LIMITS AND THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS 2

(Comm. Print 1976), dealing with the "heroic assumptions" that discredit cost-benefit analyses on the breeder reactor program; CHEMICALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 42-43; RADIATION
REPORT, supra note 16, at 68-69, II1.
The common use of "willingness to pay" valuation to quantify benefits and costs in
dollars raises an additional distributional issue. Willingness to pay, of course, is directly
related to ability to pay. The interests of lower income groups therefore will be underrepresented in cost-benefit analysis decisionmaking. If the underlying distribution of income is changed, willingness to pay for benefits and costs may likewise change. See L.
ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, supra note 55, at 11-12.
57. The decision permitting regular Concorde flights into the United States provides a
striking example of how the institutional bias of the analyst may determine the outcome of
the balancing process, particularly when subjective and incomparable factors predominate.
EPA, Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
each found the costs of expanded Concorde operations to outweigh the benefits of the proposed flights. After applying cost-benefit analysis to the same data, however, the Federal
Aviation Administration, Department of State, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration concluded that Concorde flights were justified. See Note, The Concorde
Calculus, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1037, 1061-63 (1977). See also Green, Cost-Risk Benefit
Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, id at 901.

58. Burke Zimmerman, Staff Scientist for the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, remembers "no instance where risk-benefit analysis resulted in the conclusion
that an [agency] action should be stopped." Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The CopOut of Governmental Regulation, 14 TRIAL 43, 46 (1978).

59. Self-corrective measures may include allowing a wide margin of safety or delaying
decisions until additional information reduces uncertainties. For a discussion of these techniques in the area of DNA research, see Recombinant DNA, supra note 18, at 66-67, 83-84.
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technical estimates and do not properly consider the value-laden aspects of large, irreversible risks.
In addition, the "technology-forcing function" of regulatory programs can be stifled by limited technical and economic information.
Governmental officials must often rely on the regulated industry for
news of recent technological developments. Industry information is
likely to be unduly pessimistic about the costs, reliability, and availability of new techniques. Thus, cost-benefit analysis based upon industrial information may become a mechanism for economically
convenient regulation that tends to perpetuate the technological status
quo. This result is particularly predictable when regulatory agencies
have not defined their objectives. If such objectives were established
initially, they would "drive" the regulatory process and more readily
60
force development of new technology.
F

Special Problems of Accountability

The use of cost-benefit analysis raises new issues in addition to the
usual problems of ensuring agency accountability to the courts, Congress, the President, and the public. Certainly the jargon, presumably
objective numbers, and analytical complexities of cost-benefit analysis
obscure the subjective assumptions, uncertain data, and arbitrary distributions and valuations of the decisionmaking process, thereby
preventing meaningful review of agency activity. Agency uses of costbenefit analysis tend to promote the role of experts and diminish the
61
participatory and review roles of nonexperts.
Senator Muskie has voiced his concern about agencies including
"questionable benefits" that can make projects appear "economically
60. See RADIATION REPORT, supra note 16, at 109-11; [1975] 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)MONOGRAPHS No. 21.
61. See Senator Muskie's letter requesting that "the general methodology of the benefit-cost ratio analysis as carried out by the Corps of Engineers. . . be investigated," and that
"the use of probability analysis in the calculation of benefits for water resources projects...
be reviewed." Muskie letter to GAO, supra note 3, at 19. The subsequent report of the
General Accounting Office calling for reforms in the Corps' presentation of alternatives is
not responsive to the Muskie request. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED
FORMULATION AND PRESENTATION OF WATER RESOURCES PROJECT ALTERNATIVES

PRO-

See also numerous
NRC Regulatory Guides and Environmental Impact Analyses. For example, NRC's Environmental Statement on the Tyrone Energy Park (Apr. 1977) (NUREG-0226) contains extensive cross-references to technical analyses, reports, and other background cost-benefit
analyses and information adopted by NRC. One of the critical issues, however, is dealt with
by a simple concluding sentence disconnected from the foregoing analysis: "The staff concludes that the distribution of costs and benefits does not place unreasonable costs on any
segment of the population." 1d at 10-24. The cost-benefit approaches of NRC and the
National Bureau of Standards are examples of complex regulatory decision records that are
virtually incomprehensible and unreviewable except by highly persistent and technically sophisticated individuals.
VIDE A BASIS FOR BETTER MANAGEMENT DECISIONS (Feb. I, 1978).
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sound. '6 2 He has called for evaluating projects at different stages of
completion "to find if the validity of benefits claimed at project authorization can be reaffirmed during and after construction. ' 63 No governmental agency has adopted this approach despite its obvious value in
improving subsequent uses of cost-benefit analysis.
In its cost-benefit analysis of nuclear reactor licensing decisions,
NRC estimates the population that will live near the reactor site in the
future. Yet neither NRC nor any other governmental body attempts to
control actual population growth in the areas surrounding nuclear
plants. Thus the estimated cost-benefit basis for approving a proposed
activity is not used as a planning tool for maintaining predicted costs
and benefits once the activity is undertaken. The actual costs and benefits consequently may vary considerably from those projected in the
64
analysis.
Additionally, the combination of fragmented regulatory jurisdiction over pervasive problems and increased agency reliance on costbenefit analysis ultimately leads to increased societal risk. For example, a trace metal such as mercury constitutes a health and environmental quality hazard. It is regulated by several agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Each agency
may permit some activity introducing an additional incremental
amount of the pollutant into the environment because the minor
amount of calculable human exposure or environmental harm in each
instance is offset by a broad range of postulated societal benefits. Even
though each agency may be making careful and objective decisions,
without overall interagency accounting for the increasing risk to the
general population and the environment from these many small deci65
sions, the total societal risk will continue to aggregate.
The above taxonomy of methodological problems reveals the need
for a "best efforts" approach, fostered by Congress and the President,
and administered by the agencies and the courts, to exclude the use of
cost-benefit analysis under certain conditions and to resolve rational
and humanistic concerns. This best efforts approach should focus on:
(1) improving the technical and objective quality of cost-benefit analysis; (2) establishing the limits and societal implications of cost-benefit
62.
63.
64.

Muskie letter to GAO, supra note 3, at 19.
Id
Baram, An Assessment of the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis in RegulatoryAgency De-

cision Making in RETROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT-1976,

at 20 (J. Tarr ed.

1977). This article is based in part on an analysis of various NRC enforcement deficiencies
and practical problems discussed in RADIATION REPORT, supra note 16.
65. See Baram, Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens. Why Cost-Benefit Analysis
May Be Harmful to Your Health, 78 TECH. REV. 41 (1976).
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analysis; (3) improving public participation; and (4) designing more effective measures for congressional and executive oversight of agency
practices.
III
AGENCY USES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS UNDER
STATUTORY MANDATE

Congress and the Office of the President have fostered the use of
66
cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decisionmaking through statutes
and Executive orders67 that either expressly require it or call for balancing of competing considerations. This section reviews these mandates and agency experience with cost-benefit analysis. NEPA is
discussed initially because it is a general source of authority for all federal agencies to perform balancing analyses, and because it has generated extensive litigation on the cost-benefit issue.
Although Congress frequently requires regulatory agencies to balance multiple societal objectives in their decisionmaking, it has not
provided guidance for structuring agency discretion on these substantive matters. At the most basic level, Congress should address the relative importance of factors in the balancing process, including the classic
problems of valuation, discount rates, distribution of costs and benefits,
and the analytical framework to be used in reaching decisions. By failCongress has exposed the agening to provide this legislative guidance,
68
litigation.
cies to unnecessary
66. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has determined that cost-benefit analysis is required or permitted in agency decisionmaking under many of the regulatory
provisions of the following statutes: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 135-136y (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1275 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-2082 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 301-392 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376
(West 1978 & Supp. 1979); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1978). See

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Cancer Testing Technology and Saccharin
16 (Oct. 1977).
67. See note 21 supra.

68.

For example, the court in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375

(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), ruling on the scope of balancing required
by § 111 of the Clean Air Act, held that EPA need not carry out a quantified cost-benefit

analysis in support of its performance standards for new sources. In Union Electric v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246 (1976), the Supreme Court interpreted § 110(a)(2) of the Act as barring the

consideration of economic and technological infeasibility when the EPA Administrator reviews and approves a State Implementation Plan.
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The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act and Cost-Benefit Analysis

A.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 69 requires federal agencies to consider environmental quality as an integral
part of their decisionmaking. The "action-forcing" requirement of section 102(2)(C) provides that each agency must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. ' 70 The EIS must provide a detailed account of the expected beneficial and adverse impacts
of the proposed action on the environment and evaluate possible alternatives to the action.
Sections 102(2)(A) and (B) also play a major role in the development of cost-benefit analysis under NEPA, although unlike section
102(2)(C), they contain no enforceable mandate. These two provisions
require all federal agencies to:
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have
an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation
with the Council on Environmental Quality,. . . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
along with ecogiven appropriate consideration in7 decisionmaking
1
considerations.
technical
and
nomic
In Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC 2 the District of
Columbia Circuit construed these provisions to require balancing of
environmental benefits in relation to economic and technical factors.
Interpreting NEPA's requirement that these factors be weighed in a
"detailed statement, ' 73 the court stated: "NEPA mandates a case-bycase balancing judgment on the part of the federal agencies. In each
individual case, the particular economic and technical benefits of
planned action must be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which would affect the
74
balance of values."
The court did not, however, prescribe any particular methodology,
such as fully quantified cost-benefit analysis, for carrying out this balancing analysis. Later opinions concerning EIS's prepared pursuant to
insisting on
NEPA have adhered to the balancing requirement without
75
values.
environmental
of
monetization
or
quantification
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4369 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
Id § 102(2)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A), (B).
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
449 F.2d at 1123.
See Leventhal, supra note 10, at 529.
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The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), established to assist in the implementation of NEPA, 76 has failed to provide useful guidance on the balancing requirement. An Executive order 77 authorized
CEQ to issue regulations, rather than mere guidelines, concerning
preparation of EIS's and the resolution of interagency conflicts, but
CEQ has not used these extended powers to guide the development of
cost-benefit analysis methodology under NEPA. Further, CEQ's final
regulations for NEPA, promulgated in response to Executive Order
12044,78 fail to set guidelines on critical methodological issues.7 9
Meaningful CEQ guidelines would provide agencies with a more
rational, consistent framework for addressing methodological problems
posed by NEPA. But CEQ alone cannot resolve these thorny questions. Congress eventually must address problems of "valuing" intangibles such as human health and environmental amenities.
Moreover, Congress could improve the NEPA balancing process by defining the weight to be afforded EIS results. Congress, for example,
could amend NEPA to confirm NRC's interpretation that an agency
may select any alternative with a positive EIS cost-benefit ratio unless
an "obviously superior" alternative exists, 80 or Congress could require
76. Council on Environmental Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 854 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976)).
77. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
78. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra.
79. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1979).
If a cost-benefit analysis relevant to the choice among environmentally different
alternatives is being considered for the proposed action, it shall be incorporated by
reference or appended to the statement as an aid in evaluating the environmental
consequences. To assess the adequacy of compliance with sec. 102(2)(B) of the Act
the statement shall, when a cost-benefit analysis is prepared, discuss the relationship between that analysis and any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts, values, and amenities. For purposes of complying with the Act, the weighing
of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be displayed in a
monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when there are important qualitative considerations. In any event, an environmental impact statement should at
least indicate those considerations, including factors not related to environmental
quality, which are likely to be relevant and important to a decision.
Id
80. After completion of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating power plant sites, a further
issue inevitably arises: whether NRC should select the proposed site if it is reasonably acceptable or only if it is the best site. NRC, under its own regulations requiring cost-benefit
analysis under NEPA, has determined that the best site need not be chosen, but that the
proposed site can be chosen if the results of the cost-benefit analysis are favorable and no
"obviously superior site" is an alternative. Brookhaven Report, supra note 17, at 105-06.
In its decision on Seabrook Station, the Commission determined that:
I11t would be unreasonable to say that environmental advantages automatically
take precedence.
• . . [Als the Calpert Cffs decision noted, "Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal."
• . . Two significant realities of the NEPA process support the use of the standard of obvious superiority-the inherent imprecision of cost/benefit analysis and
the probability that more adverse information has been developed respecting the
closely examined proposed site than any alternatives. The imprecision springs
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selection of the most favorable alternative. Absent clarification from
Congress, CEQ, or the courts, agencies conducting a balancing analysis
under NEPA retain considerable discretion on methodological and related procedural issues.
Lack of Congressional guidance also allows agencies to make the
initial decision about which actions are subject to the EIS requirement.
Although NEPA expressly provides for environmental impact assessment of "major federal actions,""' it does not distinguish between
rulemaking, licensing, and other federal agency actions. Agencies take
sharply different positions on the applicability of NEPA's balancing requirements to rulemaking. For example, NRC construes NEPA, together with its own enabling legislation, to authorize a quantified costbenefit analysis as part of its environmental impact assessment in its
rulemaking. 82 On the other hand, EPA does not consider its rulemaking legally subject to NEPA and prepares only a limited number of
EIS's on rulemaking actions. 83 Between these two extremes stand
agencies such as OSHA, which recognize the applicability of NEPA to
its promulgation of health and safety standards, 84 but provides that a
qualitative balancing of costs and benefits is sufficient for such actions.8 5
As a result of these uncertainties under NEPA, much of the economic analysis of rulemaking actions is made under the Executive orders discussed in Part IV. These analyses, however, need not meet the
from the nature of cost/benefit analysis. . . the factors to be compared range from
broad concerns of system planning, safety, engineering, economic and institutional
factors to environmental concerns, including ecological, biological, aesthetic, sociological, recreational, and so forth. Much of the underlying cost-benefit data is difficult of articulation, much less quantification. Given these difficulties, any
evaluation of a particular site must inevitably have a wide margin of uncertainty. . . .[Wlhere the data to be compared necessarily present a wide margin of
uncertainty, one site must appear to be substantially "better."
In re Public Service Co., 5 NRC 527-28 (1977).
Recognizing the limitations inherent in its use of cost-benefit analysis, NRC has established that cost-benefit analysis provides a rough method for attempting to structure as rational a decision process as possible,
81. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
82. See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
83. Based on its mandate to protect the environment and specific exemptions in its
enabling statutes, EPA claims to be exempt from the EIS requirements of NEPA in many of
its rulemaking activities. See [1979] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) -MONOGRAPHS No. 28, at 44.
EPA announced that it was not required by law to prepare EIS's for any of its regulatory
actions. 39 Fed. Reg. 16,186 (1974). The agency did, however, voluntarily agree to carry out
environmental impact analyses in connection with some of its major regulatory decisions on
air pollution, noise, radiation, ocean pollution, and pesticide control. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,419
(1974). The District Court rejected a similar NEPA exemption claim made by the Food and
Drug Administration in EDF v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1999.2(a) (1979).
85. Id.§ 1999.4(b). But cf.American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. grantedsub nom. Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute, 440 U.S. 906
(1979) (OSHA's benzene standard set aside because nofactual basis for estimating benefits).
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public participation and judicial review requirements for cost-benefit
analyses prepared under NEPA.
B.
1

Enabling Statutes and Cost-Benefit Analysis

EnwronmentalProtectionAgency

Statutory vagueness has caused considerable uncertainty as to
whether EPA must perform cost-benefit analysis or any other form of
balancing when regulating air, water, and radiation. Ordinarily, this
uncertainty is resolved under particular statutory provisions only after
EPA has acted, when regulated industries bring lawsuits contending
that the agency should have relied on a more formal cost-benefit analysis approach. In such cases, earlier clarification of congressional intent
would improve EPA's ability to meet its statutory obligations within
mandated time periods.
The Clean Air Act, 86 for example, precludes consideration of economic cost in setting standards for hazardous air pollutants, 87 regulating most fuel additives,8 8 and establishing national primary and
secondary ambient air standards. 89 In other areas of decisionmaking,
however, the statute allows consideration of economic costs. 90
Authority to use cost-benefit analysis in regulating pesticides is
more clearly defined. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act of 197291 requires the registration of pesticides. 92 Before approving
a registration request, EPA must determine that the pesticide "will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment." 93 These are cost-benefit based determinations because
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" is defined as "any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of
'94
any pesticide.
The Toxic Substances Control Act 95 permits EPA to take a balancing approach to the regulation of toxic chemical substances and mixtures by authorizing regulation when there is a reasonable basis to
86.
87.
88.
89.

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979).
See Clean Air Act § l 12(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(l)(B) (Supp. 1 1977).
Id § 21 l(c)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A).
Id § 109(b)(l), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1), (2).

90.

Id § 317, 42 U.S.C. § 7617. The bases for decisionmaking, however, are not al-

tered by consideration of economic costs. See note 68 supra.

91.
92.
93.

7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976).
Id. § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a).
ld § 3(c)(5)(C), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C).

94. Id § 2(bb), 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). EPA's implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R.
§ 162.11 (1979), define the "costs" associated with a pesticide largely in terms of its toxicity.
41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976) provides additional methodological guidance.

95.

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West Supp. 1979).
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conclude that unregulated manufacturing, distribution, or other activity involving a chemical may "present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment." 96 In promulgating a rule under this section, EPA must develop findings on four factors:
(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on health and the magnitude of the exposure of human beings to such substance or mixture,
(B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and
the magnitude of the exposure of the environment to such substance or
mixture,
(C) the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the
availability of substitutes for such uses, and
(D) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule,
after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small busi97
ness, technological innovation, the environment, and public health.
Based on this analysis of costs and benefits, EPA must adopt the "least
burdensome" requirements necessary to protect against the risk of in98
jury from the regulated substance.
Under the Noise Control Act of 1972,99 EPA may establish noise
emission standards "requisite to protect the public health and welfare"' 0 0 from major sources of noise for which such standards are "feasible."'' ° The standard itself is to be based on best available
technology, but additional factors may be considered, including the
cost of compliance and the extent and conditions of the product's
use. 102

EPA possesses broad authority to deal with water pollution under
the Clean Water Act.' 03 Sections of the Act establishing the construction grants program for publicly owned waste treatment works mandate the use of cost-effectiveness analysis. ' 4 Judicial decisions
interpreting section 1314(b)(1) uniformly have rejected industry contentions that EPA must justify the "best practicable technology" (BPT)
05
effluent limitations with a mathematically exact cost-benefit analysis.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (Supp. 1 1977). For a general discussion of environmental risks
presented by toxic chemicals, see Page, .4 Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar
Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978).

97.
98.

15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
Id. § 2605(a).

99. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4901-4918 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
100. Noise Control Act § 6(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
101. Id.§ 6(a)(I)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 4905(a)(l)(A), (B) (1976).
102. Id. § 6(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
104. Clean Water Act § 201(g)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(5) (Supp. 1 1977).
105. See E.l. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1030 (4th Cir. 1976),
modified on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540
F.2d 1023, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Kalur, Will Judicial Error Allow Industrial
Point Sources to A void BPT and Perhaps BAT Later: A Story of Good Intentions, Bad Dictum, and Ugly Consequence, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 955 (1979).
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Courts instead have found that EPA's use of cost-effectiveness analysis
to determine best practicable technology satisfied the statute; EPA need
not quantify benefits in monetary terms.
Similar controversy has arisen over EPA's authority to control effluent discharges by 1983 through the so-called best available technology (BAT) standards. In setting BAT standards, EPA is required to
consider the cost of achieving the desired effluent reduction, but it is
not required to balance costs against benefits as it is under the BPT
provision. By expressly requiring cost-benefit analysis under BPT but
not under BAT, 10 6 it appears that Congress intended to tolerate a
greater disparity between costs and apparent benefits under the BAT
standards than under the BPT standards.
In American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 10 7 the Third Circuit approved this interpretation of the BAT standards, noting that costs need
not explicitly be compared to benefits and that the Administrator may
exercise considerable discretion in weighing costs for purposes of defining BAT, provided that his decisions are reasonable. 0 8 The Fourth
Circuit adopted a significantly different view of the BAT requirements
in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 0 9 setting aside EPA's thermal
backfit regulations for steam electric power plants. The court concluded that the BAT provisions require EPA to compare the benefits of
thermal effluent limitation with costs for alternative levels of heat reduction in order to justify standards based on best available technology
economically achievable. 0 To date, however, no other circuit has followed AppalachianPower. Moreover, the balancing analysis mandated
by Appalachian Power does not require any radical shift in EPA's analytical technique. The court recognized that a quantified analysis of
costs and benefits would be unworkable."'I Accordingly, on remand,
EPA was required only to state the benefits, especially those to aquatic
life, associated with the various alternatives to be considered. 1 2 Wherever benefits cannot be stated, the court ruled that EPA must support
l3
that assertion with a scientific opinion."
EPA is also subject to NEPA's general mandate that agencies con106. Clean Water Act § 304(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1976), states that the
factors to be used in evaluation of the BPT "shall include consideration of the total cost of
application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from
such application." In contrast, assessment of factors in determining the BAT "shall take into

account . . . the cost of achieving such effluent reduction." Id § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(2)(B).
107. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
108. Id at 1051-52.
109. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
110. Id at 1361.
111. Id
112. Id at 1365.
113. Id at 1364.

19801

COST-BENEFITANAL YSIS

sider the environmental impact of proposed major actions and evaluate
alternatives to such actions. In one of its rare applications of NEPA's
EIS provisions, EPA prepared a "voluntary" EIS in connection with its
radiation standard for the uranium fuel cycle.'" 4 This document illustrates in detail EPA's application of cost-benefit techniques to the regulation of environmental radiation. Congressional silence about the
applicability of NEPA to EPA regulatory activities, coupled with
EPA's failure to establish a standard policy concerning its use of quantified balancing analyses, has led to varied cost-benefit analysis approaches to its rulemaking-some required by statute, others
voluntarily undertaken, and all without meaningful congressional or
agency guidance on critical methodological issues. 1 5 This brief review
of EPA authority to use cost-benefit analysis in its regulatory decisionmaking process demonstrates the substantial confusion resulting from
various statutory mandates.
2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The major statutory sources of NRC authority, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 16 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,1" do
not expressly require NRC to use cost-benefit analysis in setting standards for nuclear power activities or licensing reactors. Nevertheless,
NRC extensively uses cost-benefit analysis in its rulemaking, licensing,
and other nuclear power plant control activities. This raises two unresolved questions: (1) whether NRC has statutory authority and discretion to balance competing considerations in establishing standards
for radiation emission controls; and (2) whether NRC should use costeffectiveness analysis instead of cost-benefit analysis.
The NRC's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
used cost-benefit analysis in setting standards and issuing licenses
under the implied authority of the 1954 Act and the recommendations
of expert advisory groups. The purpose of the 1954 Act was to foster
research and development of atomic energy to promote national security and industrial progress, subject to appropriate safeguards to protect
public health and safety. 118 Given these multiple objectives, AEC
114. See

OFFICE OF

RADIATION

PROGRAMS,

U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS OF ACTIVITIES IN THE URANIUM

FUEL CYCLE,

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

(Nov. 1, 1976) (EPA Rep. No. 520/4-76-016).
See text accompanying notes 232-37 infra for further discussion of EPA's use of

STATEMENT

115.

cost-benefit analysis.
116.
1973 &
117.
118.

Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West
Supp. 1979)).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-5891 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
See ch. 1073, § 3, 68 Stat. 922 (1954) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1976)).
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could imply a duty to balance developmental interests against health
and safety in making decisions.
The AEC adopted the recommendations of several independent
advisory groups that cost-benefit methods be employed for setting standards to control exposure to ionizing radiation. The Federal Radiation
Council 1 9 recommended that licensees reduce exposures and releases
of radioactive materials "as low as is reasonably achievable," taking
into account "the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other
societal and socioeconomic considerations."1 20 The AEC adopted this
recommendation. 12'
In Crowther v. Seaborg,122 a federal court considered the validity
of AEC radiation standards and reviewed its standard-setting process,
which "requires the weighing of. . .risks and benefits."1 23 The court
noted:
[Wleighing requires a value judgment as well as a measuring, and thus
the standards are not scientific numbers below which no danger exists.
The value judgment embodies complex social and political considerations, for atomic energy has a potential that suggests unlimited benefits
to entire nations and 24presents a risk to entire populations
progeny. 1

. . .

and per-

haps their
The court upheld the AEC standards and standard-setting practices,
relying on the "strong presumption of the validity and regularity of the
standards when administrative officials decide weighty issues within the
specific area of their authority and the burden is on the plaintiffs to
' 25
overcome this presumption."'
119. The Federal Radiation Council, a presidential advisory group, was terminated in
1970 and its functions transferred to EPA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (19661970 Compilation), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. app., at 828 (1976) andin 84 Stat. 2088 (1970-197 1).
120. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1(c) (1979).
121. Id
122. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
123. Id at 1231.
124. Id
125. Id at 1234. Following this judicial affirmation of AEC practices, the National
Academy of Sciences' Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations (the BEIR
Committee), offered several recommendations for the control of ionizing radiation, including that "[nlo exposure to ionizing radiation should be permitted without the expectation of

a commensurate benefit."

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EFFECTS ON POPULA-

TIONS OF EXPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION

2 (1972).

In 1973, the International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) similarly recommended that regulation of doses of radiation be "low enough to satisfy both of two interrelated conditions: (a) the doses should be as low as is reasonably achievable, economic and
social considerations being taken into account; and (b) the doses should be justifiable by the
expected benefits of the procedures." International Commission on Radiological Protection,
Pub. No. 22, Implications of Commission Recommendations that Doses Be Kept as Low as
Readily Achievable 5 (1973). The ICRP recommendations of 1973 further provided that
"[tihe acceptability of levels of exposure to radiation for a given activity should be determined by a process of cost-benefit analysis."

19801

COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS

In the early 1970's, the AEC initiated proceedings to enhance the
use of cost-benefit analysis in its radiation programs. These proceedings, incomplete at the time of AEC's abolition and creation of the
NRC in 1974, were completed by the NRC in 1974 and resulted in the
126
adoption of Appendix I. Appendix I, included in NRC regulations,
remains the fundamental source on analytical approaches for NRC
rulemaking and other regulatory activities applicable to radiation.
There has not been any apparent NRC modification of this analytical
approach despite passage of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.127
It can be argued that the 1974 Act, which transferred many of
AEC's functions to NRC, simply did not allow NRC to continue
AEC's brand of decisionmaking as affirmed in Crowther v. Seaborg in
1970.128 Moreover, the 1974 Act arguably impaired the ability of NRC
to use cost-benefit analysis in its health and safety regulatory practices.
Because the new Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) fosters developmental activities, while NRC pursues the single
objective of ensuring public health and safety, NRC should not use
cost-benefit analyses to ensure development of nuclear power. Arguably, under the 1954 and 1974 Acts, NRC lacks clear statutory authority
to develop standards through cost-benefit based regulation. Further129
more, the EPA's off-site maximum exposure standards for radiation
"regulate the NRC" by providing the ultimate limitations on nuclear
power. It follows that the NRC role in setting ionizing radiation emission and other standards is restricted to ensuring that the radiation emanating from any plant does not surpass the EPA limits. If this
interpretation is correct, the NRC's use of cost-benefit analysis and its
valuation of broad societal and economic factors in establishing standards is unwarranted. Under these EPA limits, however, NRC could
use a cost-effectiveness approach to source regulation. This would be
consistent with the requirements of NEPA130 and various Executive orders. 13'
NRC also employs a balancing analysis in its review of nuclear
power plant construction and operating permit applications. The balancing analysis required by NEPA 132 has been shaped by subsequent
126. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 app. 1 (1979).
127. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-5891 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). The Act abolished AEC and
generally transferred its functions to ERDA. 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (a), (c) (1976). One exception
to this general authorization was the transfer to NRC of the licensing and related regulatory
functions of AEC. Id. § 5841(0.
128. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
129. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 app. 1 (1979).
130. See text accompanying notes 69-85 supra.
131. See note 21 supra. See also text accompanying notes 136-206 infra.
132. NEPA § 102(2)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)(B) (1976). See text accompanying
notes 69-71 supra.
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judicia' 33 and NRC determinations, 34 and various economic, social,
environmental and institutional constraints.135 NEPA requirements for
considering the economic and technical implications as well as the environmental effects of major federal actions can be construed as authorizing NRC use of cost-benefit analysis in the licensing of reactors.
However, NRC recognizes that such reviews essentially are now costeffectiveness analyses, given that all these constraints must be built into
their analyses.
IV
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Several Executive orders requiring economic analysis in agency
rulemaking have promoted agency use of cost-benefit analysis. Under
these orders, the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS), Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and
several Presidential aides play increasingly significant and controversial roles in forcing regulatory agencies to use cost-benefit analysis to
solve health, safety, and environmental problems. Thus regulatory
agencies carrying out their congressional mandates must justify proposed rules on health, safety, and environmental protection by demonstrating to the President that the expected benefits will exceed the
expected costs.
A.

FordAdministration "InflationaryImpact" Executive Orders

President Ford's Executive Order 11821,136 amended by Executive
133. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See
text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
134. 10 C.F.R. § 51 (1979). See also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preparation
of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations, Regulatory Guide 4.2, Revision 2,
NUREG-0099 (July 1976).
135. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preparation of Environmental Reports for
Nuclear Power Stations, Regulatory Guide 4.2, Revision 2, NUREG--0099, at viii (July

1976). Many federal health, safety, and environmental regulatory agencies other than EPA
and NRC use cost-benefit analysis in their decisionmaking process. Thus, the problems of a
proper discount rate, valuation of human life and other unquantifiable factors, arbitrary
manipulation of variables, and the distribution of costs and benefits across populations and
over generations also affect the quality of regulatory action taken by such agencies as the

Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. For a thorough review of these agencies' experience with
cost-benefit analysis and the methodological limitations of the analytical technique, see M.
Baram, Regulation of Health, Safety and Environmental Quality and the Use of Cost-Bene-

fit Analysis, (Mar. 1, 1979) (final report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States).
136.

3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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Order 11949,137 directed federal regulatory agencies to consider the inflationary impact of "all major legislative proposals, regulations, and
38
rules emanating from the executive branch of the Government.'
OMB, which held general oversight responsibility for the Inflationary
Impact Statement (IIS) programs,' 39 guided the agencies in developing
criteria for identifying "major" actions and developing procedures for
evaluating inflationary impact.
The OMB guidelines recommending that agencies use cost-beneift
analysis to determine inflationary impact' 40 appear to have had limited
effect on agency decisions.' 4 ' Since agencies had to prepare impact
statements only for "major" rulemaking proposals, individual regulations frequently fell beyond the reach of the IIS.142 As a result, logically unified programs like the Standards Completion Project of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), involving
over 300 individual regulations governing worker exposure to chemi137. 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977 Compilation).
138. 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Compilation).
139. Executive Order 11949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977 Compilation), amended the term "inflationary impact statement" to "economic impact statement." In this Article, however, the
earlier term is used and abbreviated as IIS, in order to avoid confusion with the term "environmental impact statement" (EIS), which occurs throughout the Article.
140. Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Executive Office of the President, Circular
No. A- 107 re Evaluation of the Inflationary Impact of Major Proposals for Legislation and
for the Promulgation of Regulations of Rules (Jan. 28, 1975). Such evaluations include,
where applicable:
(1) an analysis of the principal cost or other inflationary effects of the action on
markets, consumers, businesses, etc., and, where practical, an analysis of secondary cost and price effects. These analyses should have as much quantitative precision as necessary and should focus on a time period sufficient to
determine economic and inflationary impacts.
(2) a comparison of the benefits to be derived from the proposed action with the
estimated costs and inflationary impacts. These benefits should be quantified
to the extent practical.
(3) a review of alternatives to the proposed action that were considered, their
probable costs, benefits, risks, and inflationary impacts compared with those
of the proposed action.
Id at 2.
141. This judgment was reached after numerous personal discussions with personnel in
OMB and several agencies in Washington, D.C. (1978).
142. Early review of the IIS program revealed inadequacies in agency procedures for
identifying major and minor regulatory actions. OMB proposed a measure to tighten up the
identification process:
1. Agencies must state in the Federal Register at the time of publication that
minor rules and regulations (that is, those whose impacts do not exceed the IIS
criteria) have been reviewed and do not require an IIS. A similar statement
should be made in correspondence to OMB for legislative proposals deemed to
be minor.
2. Upon request from the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS), an
agency must provide a brief description of its reasons for concluding that a
proposed action is minor.
Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Executive Office of the President, Memorandum re
Changing IIS Requirements (June 11, 1976).
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cals, escaped cost-benefit analysis.143
OMB eventually established a numerical threshold to define "major" action. Regulations with an expected economic impact of $100
million per year were classifed as major, 44 and hence required an IIS.
The agencies, however, proved adept at getting around this new requirement by spacing out the effect of important regulations over sevof
eral years and by dividing regulatory programs so that effects
45
individual components fell below the $100 million threshold.1
NRC, already using cost-benefit analysis, chose not to implement
the Executive orders and OMB guidelines. Its officials asserted that
NRC was an independent commission not subject to these executive
requirements, and that its sensitive task of controlling substantial radiation hazards should not be shaped by inflationary impact considerations. 146 Agency analysts expressed difficulties in integrating IIS
derived
analysis and procedures with preexisting regulatory analyses
1
47
practices.
administrative
and
mandates
statutory
from
Agencies such as EPA and OSHA, which administer statutes that
allow only limited consideration of economic factors, viewed the IIS
procedure as an unnecessary requirement inhibiting implementation of
their statutory mandates and adding to their already considerable administrative burdens. 4 8 Furthermore, OMB and the agencies did not
require the IIS and background analytical documents to be included in
the decision record, and therefore subject to public disclosure and
eventual judicial review under the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act 149 and Freedom of Information Act.15 0 Thus, the IIS
that
procedure avoided the public participation and judicial review
51
could ensure accountable agency use of cost-benefit analysis.'
143.

Although an EIS was prepared for the entire project, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,843 (1974),

economic analyses were only prepared for subgroups within the project. See, e.g., 41 Fed.
Reg. 29,425 (1976).
144. Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Executive Office of the President,
Memorandum re Uniform Criteria (June 3, 1975).
145. Interviews with OMB and COWPS staff in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
146. Id
147. Id
148. EPA, in particular, regarded the program with special skepticism because it was
administered by OMB. EPA had been the main focus of the Nixon Administration's "Quality of Life" review. According to some observers, OMB used this review process to diminish
EPA achievements in protecting environmental quality and to delay important actions. See

[19761 7
149.

ENVIR. REP.

(BNA) 693.

5 U.S.C. §§ 500-703 (1976).

150. Id § 552.
151. Despite these shortcomings, the IIS program might have influenced agency decisionmaking considerably if courts enforced the requirements of Executive Order 11821 in
private lawsuits. In Independent Meat Packers v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976), the court held that private parties cannot enforce the require-

ment to prepare an IIS because the IIS program "was intended primarily as a managerial
tool for implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a legal frame-
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These inadequacies of the IIS process were significant since OMB
supervision guided the cost-benefit analysis practices of many federal
agencies. As a result, wide variation in agency practice developed. The
Federal Energy Administration (FEA), for example, concluded that its
procedures for economic analysis developed in response to the IIS Executive orders satisfied its statutory obligations. 52 Other agencies prepared IIS pursuant to NEPA or other statutory authority, subject to
various procedural safeguards.
Moreover, OMB and COWPS personnel acknowledge that OMB
did not develop satisfactory procedures for assuring that agencies applied the IIS requirements and conducted cost-benefit analyses in good
faith. 153 In addition, placing the IIS program under the exclusive jurisdiction of OMB removed key decisions concerning the identification of
costs and benefits, discount rates, and valuation of intangible benefits
from wider public control. For example, OMB established a ten percent discount rate for evaluating costs and benefits distributed over
54
time, without congressional or public participation.
During this period, COWPS asserted its authority to monitor and
analyze inflationary impacts throughout the economy. 155 COWPS' reviews of proposed agency rulemaking under its own statutory authority' 56 are filed with the agency during the public comment period and
therefore are available to the public. 157 COWPS reviews also occur off
the agency record when CEA and various individual aides to the Presi58
dent ask COWPS to provide staff and analyses on economic matters.
Given these opportunities, COWPS has actively participated in agency
proceedings subject to IIS and subsequent Executive order requirework enforceable by private civil action." Id at 234-36. See also National Renderers Ass'n
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1976) (court refused to base private party's successful challenge of EPA new source standards on Executive Order 11821). By the same token, procedural or methodological deficiencies in cost-benefit analyses included in an agency IIS

presumably could not be challenged in private lawsuits.
152. See Brookhaven Report, supra note 17, at 171-92.
153. Interviews with staff of OMB, COWPS, and agencies subject to OMB memoranda
in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
154. Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Executive Office of the President, Circular
No. A-94 re Discount rates to be used in evaluating time-distributed costs and benefits (Mar.
27, 1972).
155. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)). Council authority was most recently
extended to September 30, 1980, by Pub. L. No. 96-10, 93 Stat. 23 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1904 (West Pamphlet 2, 1979)).
156. COWPS is authorized to review and intervene in agency and department proceed-

ings. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 note (3)(a)(7), (8) (West Supp. 1979).
157. Editor's telephone interview with Roy Nierenberg, COWPS Deputy General Counsel (Jan. 21, 1980).

158. Interview with Roy Nierenberg, COWPS Deputy General Counsel and John
Moralles, COWPS Senior Economist, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1978).
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ments. 159
While the Ford Executive orders were in effect, COWPS reviewed
IIS's prepared by agencies, assessing them independently and commenting on their inflationary impact. COWPS also began intervening
aggressively in agency proceedings "to present its views as to the inflationary impact that might result from the possible outcomes of such
proceedings" although the Council has "no legislative authority to impose mandatory controls nor . . . to prevent or delay any federal
160
agency action."'
In a typical case, COWPS appeared before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission in 1977 and presented extensive testimony on
CPSC's proposed power lawn mower safety standard. COWPS' testimony stated several bases for its objection to the proposed standardsprimarily that they were based on insufficient information and that
16 1 COWPS
COWPS' estimates show costs exceeding benefits.
presented estimates that the first-year cost of the standard would be
greater than $371 million, that sales would decrease, and that the dollar
benefits of reducing the annual tolls of injury and death (56,000 injuries
and twenty-five deaths in 1976) would probably fall below $163 mil162
lion, thereby producing an unfavorable benefit to cost ratio.
Earlier COWPS comments reveal its untested assumptions about
social costs. For example, COWPS disputed estimates that the "cost of
a day incapacitated" was forty dollars and that an average wage rate of
$225 per week be used in calculating the costs of permanent disability. 163 It assumed that any pain and suffering costs, as proposed by
others appearing before CPSC were overestimated, 164 and that the
value of life amounts proposed were probably overestimated to the extent they exceeded the $240,000 amount estimated by the National
165
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
CPSC responded by internally disputing, in part, COWPS' estimates and other aspects of its cost-benefit analysis methodology, and its
primary reliance on cost-benefit in setting health and safety regulations
159.

In a quarterly report, for example, COWPS revealed its selective involvement in

OSHA proceedings on machine guards and benzene exposure, CPSC proceedings on power
lawn mowers, and its filing of numerous reports on other health, safety, and environmental
problems within the regulatory jurisdiction of EPA, OSHA, CPSC, FDA and other agencies.
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

QUARTERLY REPORT at iv (Oct. 1977).
160. Id at 9-12.
161. Council on Wage and Price Stability, Comments before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission on Power Lawn Mowers under 16 C.F.R. § 1205 (Aug. 12, 1977).
162. Id at 7-14.
163. Council on Wage and Price Stability, Comments before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission on Proposed Lawn Mower Safety Standard 9-10 (Oct. 14, 1975).
164. Id at 9-13.
165. Id at 12.
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under its enabling act. 166 In February 1979 CPSC published a final
standard which is not effective until January 1982.167 While influencing CPSC's balancing analysis and the ultimate standard, COWPS
delayed the promulgation of the safety standard.
COWPS repeatedly has demonstrated this disturbing ability to influence safety standards and delay agency action by using economic
studies laden with arbitrary assumptions about health and other matters that transcend economic expertise. The significant roles played by
COWPS and OMB under the Ford Executive orders rested on no particular expertise about, nor demonstrated concern for, the social, environmental, and other noneconomic issues involved.
In 1976 COWPS and OMB solicited agency and public comments
on the IIS program 68 and received a wide variety of guarded criticisms, particularly from the health, safety, and environmental regulasubsequently extended the IIS
tors. 169 Executive Order 11949170
71
1977.1
of
end
the
until
program
B.

CarterAdministration 'Regulatory Analysis" Executive Order

1. Executive Order 12044
The Carter administration, faced with the need to control inflation
and with increasing criticism of federal regulation, promulgated Execu166. See Internal Memorandum of Consumer Product Safety Commission, re Power
Lawn Mower Comments (Feb. 6, 1978).
167. 44 Fed. Reg. 9990 (1979) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 1205).
168. 41 Fed. Reg. 32,463 (1976).
169. For example, the Department of Commerce called for "specific guidelines" to assure "uniform applications, similar to environmental impact statement guidelines of the U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality." EPA recommended phasing out the IIS program and
felt that "there are definite limitations in the state of the art of benefits estimation in the
environmental areas." HEW felt that "the analyses should be public as a matter of principle" and a staff analysis pointed out the "many pitfalls in application" of cost-benefit analysis. The Food and Drug Administration recommended discontinuance. The Department of
Labor commented that the IIS program had not clearly encouraged "better planning and
management within government." Letters on file with OMB in response to 41 Fed. Reg.
32,463 (1976). Nevertheless, COWPS' summary report indicates little agency opposition to
the IIS program. See Council on Wage and Price Stability and Office of Management and
Budget, An Evaluation of the Inflation Impact Statement Program (Dec. 7, 1976).
170. 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977 Compilation).
171. Id at 162. The Carter administration indicated, however, that the evaluation of
economic impact by regulatory agencies would be reconsidered. CEA then circulated drafts
for new economic analyses. One of the most significant CEA departures from Ford administration practice was its proposed modification of the cost-benefit approach being used in all
economic analyses. CEA indicated that it would stress selection of the least costly regulatory
alternative-a cost-effectiveness approach-and that therefore CEA would address the
methods of achieving regulatory goals without attempting to influence the establishment of
the goals themselves. See [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 581. For EPA's response to the CEA
draft guidelines, see id. at 699. This proposed approach was not followed, however, after
enactment of President Carter's Executive Order 12044.
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tive Order 12044 on March 23, 1978.172 The Order requires agencies to
prepare a "regulatory analysis" for all regulations having an annual
impact of at least $100 million on the economy or causing a "major"
price increase for an industry, level of government, or geographic
area. 73 Each analysis must state the problem addressed, describe the
economic consequences of alternative solutions, and explain the selection of one alternative over the others. 174 The Order provides for public notice of preliminary analyses and periodic review of existing
75
regulations. It directs OMB to ensure effective implementation.
The new Executive order affords OMB, CEA, and COWPS considerable discretion to shape agency use of regulatory analysis. OMB,
CEA, and COWPS have used this freedom to reinstate the cost-benefit
analysis practices of the earlier Ford Executive orders that the Carter
administration ostensibly sought to avoid.176 OMB has issued a memorandum to implement Executive Order 12044 by providing the agencies
with "guidance on the contents of a regulatory analysis."'' 77 The guidance, developed with CEA and COWPS, requires agencies to comand
pare the economic consequences of each alternative regulation
178
other.
the
over
alternative
one
choosing
for
explain the reasons
172. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978 Compilation). The Order also calls on agencies to minimize
paperwork, publish a semiannual agenda of proposed regulations and existing regulations
under review, and improve public participation and the oversight role of agency administrators in regulatory proceedings. Id at 153. In addition, agencies are to use new criteria in
developing final regulations including the writing of regulations "in plain English," evaluation of alternatives to regulation, and estimation of reporting burdens created by the proposed regulations. Id at 154.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id. at 155-56. As of September 1978, virtually all agencies subject to Executive
Order 12044 had published their proposed implementing regulations in the Federal Register. Regulatory analyses were not required in pending rulemaking proceedings if an Economic Impact Statement had already been prepared in accordance with Executive Orders
11821 and 11949. Id at 155.
176. See J.Morall, Regulatory Reform in the Carter Administration 5 (paper presented
at the Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meeting in New York, Dec. 28, 1977).
177. Memorandum from Wayne G. Granquist, Associate Director for Management and
Regulatory Policy, Office of Management and Budget, to the Heads of Departments and
Agencies, entitled "Regulatory Analysis" (Nov. 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OMB Memorandum on Regulatory Analysis].
178. Id The memorandum provides, inter alia, that each agency analysis contain:
(3) An analysis of the economic consequences-direct as well as indirect effects, and their significance-of each of these alternatives (including the no action
alternative); such consequences should be presented in comparative form to
sharpen the issues and provide a clear basis for choice among alternatives; these
consequences include:
(a) specific burdens imposed by each alternative
(i) what types of burdens (and how much) are placed on specific
groups as a result of compliance?
" capital outlays
" other costs of compliance including operating and maintenance costs
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Executive Order 12044 and the OMB memorandum do not use the
terms cost, benefit, or cost-benefit analysis. Instead, they use the terms
burdens, gains, and overall economic impact. Nevertheless, their practical effect has been to authorize the continued use of cost-benefit analysis. 179
2. Regulatory Analyses Conducted by the Regulatory Anaysis Review
Group and the Council on Wage and Price Stability
The newly established Regulatory Analysis Review Group
(RARG) chaired by the CEA and staffed by COWPS, 80 conducts a
limited number of special economic analyses in addition to those imposed on the agencies under Executive orders and statutes enforced by
OMB, COWPS and CEA. President Carter stated that RARG's role is
"to review agency regulatory analyses and to consult with the agencies
on the conduct of such analyses," and "to conduct an interagency re* administrative burden (reporting requirements, delays, uncertainty, etc.).
(ii) who bears those burdens?
0 what burden falls on what types of enterprises, levels of government, major geographic regions, communities, and urban
areas? (e.g., the impact on employment, fiscal condition,
availability of public services, etc.)
o how are consumers and various population groups burdened? (e.g., income distribution, housing availability, etc.).
(b) specific gains produced
(i) what types of specific gains (and how much) to society as a
whole would each alternative produce?
(ii) who would be helped, how, and by how much, by each
alternative?
(c) overall economic impacts of each alternative
(i) how would productivity and overall economic efficiency be
affected?
(ii) how would prices and employment be affected?
(iii) how would the U.S. foreign trade position be affected (e.g., effect of increased costs for domestic companies on the price of
goods that compete with imports, effect of increased costs for
domestic companies on the price of U.S. exports, effect on the
quality or utility of products and thus on the demand for U.S.
exports, extent to which foreign competitors are subject to similar regulations, effect on competition between U.S. and foreign suppliers in third countries)?
(4) A detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one alternative over
the others; questions to be answered:
(a) Will the selected alternative produce the intended results in the least
burdensome manner possible? If not, why is this the preferred alternative?
(b) Why isn't the action more stringent?-less stringent? What tradeoffs
does the selected alternative reflect?
Id at 3-4. For other OMB promulgations implementing Executive Order 12044, see 43 Fed.
Reg. 21,997 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 24,219 (1978).
179. See J. Morall, supra note 176.
180. President Carter informally established RARG to consult with agencies and to review agency regulatory analyses prepared under Executive Order 12044. 43 Fed. Reg.
12,668 (1978).
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view of 10-20 regulatory analyses each year."' 18 CEA, however, directed RARG to use cost-benefit analyses that are substantially similar
to the regulatory analysis requirements that OMB imposes on the agencies.1 82 RARG's Executive Committee selects certain agency proposals
for detailed analysis on the basis of several criteria, including potential
economic impacts and total cost, the precedential value of RARG action, regulatory overlap or conflicts between agencies, and the inade83
quacy of the agency's own regulatory analysis.
COWPS typically takes two to four weeks to produce a draft analysis for RARG. 1 84 When RARG reaches a consensus on the draft,
Presidential aides may also review the report before the COWPS
Director files the report for the agency record. RARG members may
file dissenting opinions. Although RARG's deliberations are closed to
the public, its reports are filed for the agency record, which is available
to the public.
The ultimate reconciliation of an agency's regulatory analysis and
the RARG report rests with the agency. But as a practical matter,
RARG exerts considerable influence on the agency. This influence
may result in part from new, convincing data, exposure of deficiencies
in the agency's own analysis, or RARG's innovative regulatory approach. 85 The primary reason for RARG's influence, however, is that
86
its reports issue directly from the Office of the President.
COWPS lacks a uniform policy for dealing with many methodological limitations of cost-benefit analysis 87 that it encounters when
181. Id.
182. Compare Memorandum from Regulatory Analysis Group, Council of Economic
Advisors, U.S. Office of the President, entitled "Regulatory Analysis" (undated, but issued
summer, 1978) with OMB Memorandum on Regulatory Analysis, supra note 177.
Given the narrow economic course set for the agencies and RARG by OMB and CEA,
pressures developed to create yet another regulatory oversight organization to deal more
readily with the societal benefits of health, safety, and environmental programs and to be
more favorably disposed to their implementation in the face of economic analyses. This led
to Carter's creation of the Regulatory Council, following the suggestions of EPA officials.
See Memorandum from President Carter to Executive Departments and Agencies, entitled
"Strengthening Regulatory Management" (Oct. 31, 1978). For some preliminary indications
as to the Council's agenda, see 5 EPA J. 29 (1979). The Council intends to establish a
regulatory calendar providing an overview of all agency activities and to improve benefit
calculations. The OMB staff, however, believes that trying to place a conclusive value on
benefits will only lead to further controversy. Interviews with Peter Petkas, Executive Director of the Regulatory Council, and OMB and COWPS staff, in Washington, D.C. (Fall
1978).
183. Interview with John Moralles, COWPS Senior Economist, in Washington, D.C.
(Dec. 1978).
184. Discussion of RARG procedure based on interviews with COWPS staff economists
and attorneys in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
185. The RARG process has been characterized by OMB and COWPS staff as a reasonable approach to increased agency awareness of the excessive regulation problem. Id
186. Id
187. See text accompanying notes 27-65 supra.
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preparing regulatory analyses for RARG or under its own independent
statutory authority.18 8 Each analyst selects a discount rate and estimates critical factors, such as the economic valuation of health and environmental benefits and the allocation of costs and benefits to different
societal sectors, without any meaningful guidelines.' 89 COWPS staff
contend that this ad hoc approach results from the different styles of
analysts and the differences between proposed regulations. ,90 In addition, RARG analyses incorporate technical positions and studies done
by the OSTP 19 1 even though these reports are much less thorough and
sophisticated than the original agency study.' 92 Despite the absence of
a consistent approach to methodological problems, RARG reports filed
in 1978193 reveal its preferences for performance standards over design
standards, incremental economic incentives over standards enforced by
fixed penalties, and individual choice over government-dictated outcomes. These preferences, which occasionally lead to recommended
innovative regulatory approaches, challenge the justifications for
agency action.
An additional assumption consistently injected into COWPS'
analyses is the necessity for maintaining the economic status quo.
COWPS does not encourage either redistributing income or impairing
the economic status of regulated firms to solve a health, safety, or environmental problem. COWPS believes that agencies share this assump188. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 note (West Supp.
1979).
189. Interview with COWPS staff in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
190. Id
191. Congress created OSTP by the Presidential Science and Technology Advisory Organization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-282, 90 Stat. 463 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 6611 (1976)),
following the recommendations of President Ford. Executive Order 12039, 43 Fed. Reg.
8095 (1978), transferred various advisory functions to it. OSTP has become a consulting

service organization providing technical support for the analyses and recommendations
COWPS provides RARG. See Report of Dr. Frank Press, Director, OSTP, to the House
Committee on Science and Technology (Oct. 31, 1978), which describes in some detail numerous OSTP functions, but nowhere describes its role of serving COWPS and RARG other
than alluding to "numerous other areas where equal [OSTP] attention is given to contemporary issues, usually with action-oriented policy or management decisions in mind."
192. See, for example, the RARG report for EPA's proposed revision of the national

ambient air quality standards for photochemical oxidants (the ozone standard), 43 Fed. Reg.
26,962 (1978). The report criticizes EPA reliance on the consensus of expert panels, existing
research and literature, and monitoring systems in establishing its proposed rule, but

presents little evidence to support its own preferences.
193. In 1978, RARG filed reports with agencies on four proposed agency actions: EPA's
national ambient air quality standards for photochemical oxidants (filed Oct. 16, 1978);
OSHA's rules on worker exposure to acrylonitrile (filed May 19, 1978); Department of

Transportation's rules on nondiscrimination against the handicapped (filed Oct. 24, 1978);
and OSHA's rules on toxic substances posing a potential occupational carcinogenic risk
(filed Oct. 24, 1978).
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tion. 194
COWPS usually files its own analysis of a proposed rule for the
agency record during the public comment period. 19 5 Frequently, however, it conducts a second review of the final regulation after the close
of the comment period and before publication. 196 The CEA and other
Presidential aides initiate these additional COWPS reviews, which are
then used off the record and in ways beyond COWPS' formal control. 197 COWPS analyses so used wield additional influence, regardless
of any arbitrary assumptions and inadequate technical arguments they
might contain. Because of such ex parte influence and record deficiencies, subsequent judicial review of the final agency action cannot ensure that the agency acted properly on the basis of available
98
evidence. 1
Several agencies and interest groups have expressed opposition to
RARG activities. EPA, for example, disagreed strongly with the
RARG report on EPA's proposed photochemical oxidants regulation.199 EPA considered the approach illegal because it calls for a consideration of cost prohibited by the Clean Air Act, inadequate because
it fails to provide for full review of all available medical evidence, and
inaccurate because it overstates control cost estimates. 20 ° Despite the
apparent weaknesses of the technical criticisms expressed by COWPS
194. Interview with John Moralles, COWPS Senior Economist, and Roy Nierenberg,
COWPS Deputy General Counsel, in Washington, D.C., (Dec. 1978).
195. Id.
196. ld
197. Id
198. See the discussion of agency contacts with interested persons under Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,412 (1978):
The agency should address the question of how it handles contacts with persons interested in a developing rule. Such frequent and informal contacts between
agency decisionmaking personnel and interested outsiders at this stage of the process are unavoidable and usually desirable. Yet they may give rise to suspicions of
improper influence, particularly where the pattern of contacts seems disproportionately to favor particular requirements, preparation of memoranda of significant
contacts for inclusion in the rulemaking file, open meetings, and conscious efforts
to balance contacts.
Id at 36,417. See also, Putting Ex Parte Communications in the Record, id at 36,419.
A Justice Department memorandum concludes that there is neither a constitutional nor
a statutory bar to contacts between presidential aides and agency rulemakers if procedural
safeguards of this type are observed. Memorandum from Larry A. Hammond, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, entitled, "Consultation with Council of Economic Advisors Concerning Rulemaking
under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act," (Jan. 17, 1979). See also Nathanson,
Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REV. 377 (1978); Wright, Rulemaking and JudicialReview, id. at 461.
199. See note 192 supra.
200. Memorandum from Walter C. Barber, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to David G. Hawkins, Assistant Administrator for Air, Noise, and Radiation, re
Council on Wage and Price Stability/Regulatory Analysis Review Group Critique of the
Proposed Ozone Ambient Air Quality Standard (Nov. 8, 1978).
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and OSTP, they strongly influenced the outcome; EPA's final standards
were significantly less stringent and less protective of health than its
proposed rules. 20 The final standards, however, presumably will
''cost" less than the proposed standards.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) considers RARG a
threat to "important commitments. . . to the health and welfare of the
American people, with little or no effect on inflation or government
efficiency. '20 2 EDF has sought (1) to confine RARG's activities to the
public comment period; (2) to have RARG file a summary of its meetings with agency officials for the agency record; (3) to have RARG
open all its meetings to the public; and (4) to prevent RARG from delaying the regulatory process, particularly prior to proposed rulemaking. EDF, RARG, and other Presidential advisors have discussed these
20 3
issues, but no changes have resulted in RARG policy to date.
The controversy continues in the media 2°4 and in Congress. In
February 1979 Senator Muskie conducted hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution "to assess the merit, legality
and political ramifications of the White House economists' roles in
environmental regulations. ' 20 5 The chairmen of COWPS and CEA
testified, along with representatives of various environmental organiza20 6
tions.
201. 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). In its summary of the
final rulemaking, EPA outlined the extent to which it changed its position:
On June 22, 1978, EPA proposed changes in the standard (43 FR 26962) based on
the findings of the revised criteria. The proposed changes included (1) raising the
primary standard to 0.10 ppm, (2) retaining the 0.08 ppm secondary standard, (3)
changing the chemical designation of the standard from photochemical oxidants to
ozone, and (4) changing to a standard with a statistical rather than deterministic
form. The final rulemaking will make three further changes in the standard: (1)
Raising the primary standard to 0.12 ppm, (2) raising the secondary standard to
0.12 ppm, and (3) changing the definition of the point at which the standard is
attained to "when the expected number of days per calender year with maximum
hourly average concentrations above 0.12 ppm is equal to or less than one."
Id EPA asserted that the changes, deemed harmful by many, were not the result of a tradeoff between health and economic considerations or a RARG type of economic analysis. Id
at 8213.
202. See letter from Robert J. Rauch, Staff Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund, to
Charles Schultze, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors (July 19, 1978).
203. The Center for Law and Social Policy, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Appalachian Coalition, the Council of the Southern Mountains, Inc., the Northern Plains
Resources Council, Illinois South, and the Texas Committee on Natural Resources have
filed a consolidated action challenging ex parte contacts between members of CEA and the
Department of the Interior in connection with proposed permanent strip mining regulations.
COWPS prepared a report on behalf of RARG concerning the proposals in early 1979,
which CEA members allegedly passed on to the Department of the Interior after the public
comment period had closed. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations Litigation, No.
79-1144 (D.D.C., filed June 6, 1979).
204. See, e.g., Should Presidents Bend the Rules?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1979, § A, at 24,
col. 1.

(BNA) 1993.

205.

[1979] 9

206.

See Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the

ENVIR. REP.
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3. Regulatory Reform. Conflicts and Opportunities
Regulatory reform is in a state of flux, as COWPS, CEA, OMB,
RARG, OSTP, the new Regulatory Council (RC), 20 7 agencies, and
Congress 20 8 respond to Executive Order 12044. Controversy grows
over the use of regulatory analyses, the adequacy of the methodologies
employed, and the proper degree of Presidential involvement in agency
decisionmaking. Regulatory reviews conducted under President
Carter's Order provide new opportunities to influence agency actions
on economic grounds under the aegis of the Office of the President,
regardless of the merit of the analytical approaches used. Without uniform guidance on the critical methodological limitations of cost-benefit
analysis, important public policy issues raised by these limitations are
left to staff economists, consultants, and Presidential advisors.2 0 9 Regulatory cost-benefit analysis has become a numbers game that eludes accountability.
Arguably, flexibility may be justified while agencies learn to analyze costs, benefits and alternative regulatory actions. OMB staff acknowledge the need for formalization, but not until they gain five or six
years of experience with Executive Order 12044 and the regulatory calSubcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public

Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
207. See note 182 supra on the creation of the Regulatory Council.
208. Congress is now assessing the President's efforts and considering its own initiatives.
Senators Ribicoff, Kennedy, and others introduced a bill "to provide for the regulatory analysis of proposed rules and the review of existing rules by the agencies." S. 262, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 602 (1979). The bill carefully provides that the agency draft and final regulatory
analyses for proposed major rules include estimates of "projected economic, and projected
which the agency is permitted by law to
health, safety and other noneconomic effects .
take into account." Id § 603.
The bill, however, provides no intelligible principle for agency consideration of both
quantifiable economic factors and unquantifiable noneconomic factors such as health,
safety, and environmental effects. Nor does the bill provide any guidance for valuing unquantifiables, for using discount rates, or for detemining appropriate distributions of the
effects across societal sectors. The bill, if enacted, may well dissuade agencies from undertaking purely economic analyses of the type fostered by Executive Order 12044. Conversely,
however, it may provide the necessary authority for agencies to incorporate all these considerations into a cost-benefit analysis or regulatory analysis type of framework, with predictable problematic results.
Furthermore, the bill provides that "[any regulatory analysis prepared.., under...
this title, including any procedure involved therein . . . shall not be subject to any judicial
review in any court." Id § 607. Without the accountability provided by judicial review,
and without consistent and vigorous oversight by Congress of agency regulatory analyses,
the agencies will have considerable discretion to use and abuse regulatory analysis.
It should be noted that in most respects relevant to this Article, S. 262 is substantially
similar to S. 755, the "President's bill" filed in 1979 to promote legislative enactment to
Executive Order 12044 requirements. As of publication date, the Senate has not acted on
either bill.
209. OMB and CEA guidelines are couched in general terms and are silent on key methodological problems. See text accompanying notes 176-79 supra.
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endar. 2 10 They believe that formalization now would force agencies
and Presidential offices to misallocate their resources by directing
agency personnel to focus on trivial aspects of their decisions. 21 , In
addition, OMB staff fear that articulation of assumptions could lead to
litigation, with decisions on controlling costs being made in the courts,
similar to the NEPA experience.
This desire to maintain flexibility explains OMB's failure to promote its ten percent discount rate memorandum 2 12 or to promulgate
standardized approaches to the valuation or distribution of effects issues. OMB thus preserves the executive branch staffs discretion for
dealing with precisely those persistent methodological problems that
transcend analyst expertise.
Finally, the roles of RARG, RC, COWPS, OMB, CEA, OSTP,
special Presidential advisors, and the agencies themselves in the regulatory reform process are overlapping and unclear. Guidelines have been
issued in an inconsistent and uncoordinated manner, while earlier
memoranda, such as OMB's 1972 circular on the ten percent discount
rate 2 13 are ignored, but remain unrevoked, creating confusion among
regulated firms, interest groups, and the public. Cost-benefit analysis
has been acclaimed as a panacea for many perceived ills of the regulatory decisionmaking process; however, a clear need exists to reform this
reform program through coordination of review functions and generic
treatment of persistent methodological problems.
V
AGENCY STRUCTURING OF DISCRETION IN COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS

Congress, CEQ, COWPS, RARG and OMB all have failed to address fully the significant methodological limitations and high potential
for abuse of cost-benefit analysis. One solution, in the absence of
meaningful legislative oversight or guidance to agency decisionmakers,
is agency self-regulation.
Courts expect agencies to structure their decisionmaking discretion
through rulemaking, thereby promoting agency reliability, predictability, and accountability. 2 14 Professor Davis is the leading proponent of
this view: "When agencies have inadequately provided guides for their
exercise of discretion, courts . . . should require clarification through
210. Interview with OMB staff in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1978).
211. Id
212. Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Executive Office of the President, Circular
No. A-94 re Discount Rates to be Applied in Evaluating Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits (Mar. 27, 1972).
213. Id
214. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 143, 148 (1972).
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rules or standards. The combination of such clarification with required
statement of findings and reasons in individual cases is one of the most
important arrangements for protecting against arbitrary exercise of discretionary power. ' ' 2t 5 Davis believes that administrators "are clearly in
the best position" to confine administrative power
because they have the most direct knowledge of practical needs with
respect to [that] power.
The improvement in the quality of justice may stem from
three interlocked items-the guides for discretion, the control of discretion through the requirement that findings and reasons. . . be related
2 16
to the guides, and the increased effectiveness of the judicial check.
Explaining the procedures and assumptions of agency decisionmaking will improve agency accountability and foster an adequate record for judicial review, particularly review of informal rulemaking.
Judge Wright has stated:
[Ihf courts are going to make a searching and careful review of the facts
in an informal rulemaking proceeding, they will need a proper record.
How will a court determine whether the agency's action is arbitrary or
capricious or supported by substantial evidence without a record? In
spite of continuing exhortations and admonitions from many courts,
including our own, today's informal rulemaking proceedings often do
not provide a proper record.
Some government agencies and departments seem to be operating
under the old assumption that agency expertise is a proper blanket with
which to insulate themselves from searching judicial review. But the
insulation is occuring at a time when lower courts are being required by
the Supreme Court to pierce the blanket and get to the facts and the
underlying policy considerations-not to weigh them but to consider
them to determine whether the agency action under review is rational.

2 17

This review of legal, methodological, and institutional issues associated with the extended use of cost-benefit analysis suggests several
215.

Id. at 156. Agency articulation on a case-by-case basis of how discretion is used

also can improve agency accountability. COWPS itself, in its major study of the inflationary
impact statement program, called for agency explicitness on a case-by-case basis:
The cost-benefit analyses of the proposed regulations that have been performed on
OSHA regulations have been done by other Federal agencies such as CWPS and
EPA. If [the Department of Labor's] IIS's were structured so as to reveal explicitly
the costs and benefits of alternative proposals it would be stronger evidence than is
presently available that OSHA views its IIS analysis as a management tool for
improving regulatory decision-making rather than as a hurdle to overcome in
promulgating regulations.
U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, An
Evaluation of the Inflation Impact Statement Program 68 (Dec. 7, 1976). Furthermore, the
OMB guidelines also call for agency articulation on a case-by-case basis in rulemaking.

OMB Memorandum on Regulatory Analysis, supra note 177.
216. K. DAvIs, supra note 214, at 144, 148.
217. Wright, supra note 198, at 464.
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criteria to measure agency self-regulation of discretion: (1) statutory
authority should clearly guide agency choice of analytical methods; (2)
an agency should develop appropriate methods for dealing with methodological limitations; (3) an agency should promulgate generic rules
to limit ad hoc arbitrary assumptions; and (4) an agency should conduct its cost-benefit analysis in good faith, as indicated by the timing
and weight it accords cost-benefit analysis in its decisions. These criteria are considered below in the context of two agencies that use costbenefit analysis in decidedly different ways, NRC and EPA.
A.

Statutory Authority and Guidancefor Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Federal agencies draw support for using cost-benefit analysis in
their decisionmaking process from a variety of sources: NEPA, Executive orders, enabling statutes, and agency discretion. At present, agencies do not consistently identify the source of authority for using costbenefit analysis although important legal issues, such as the degree of
public participation required, often depend upon the particular authority relied upon. 21 8 Judicial review of cost-benefit analysis. decisions
also depends upon the legal authority that determined the agency's analytical method. For example, an NRC cost-benefit analysis in a reactor licensing proceeding carried out under NEPA must meet the Act's
detailed statement requirement, 2 19 including additional requirements
developed by the judiciary in construing NEPA. 220 On the other hand,
an NRC cost-benefit analysis carried out under other authority, such as
the Atomic Energy Act, must provide reasonable assurance that public
health will be protected.2 2 ' Furthermore, if agencies stated the implications of using various cost-benefit analysis authority and identified the
authority actually relied upon, the agency's legal basis for adopting a
particular methodological approach would be open to congressional,
judicial, and public scrutiny.
218. For example, an agency performing cost-benefit analysis pursuant to NEPA is required to provide for public notice and comment, and may permit public hearings, in the
preparation of environmental impact statements. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)

(1976). See also City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 585 (E.D. Mich.
1975). On the other hand, it may be difficult to secure a similar degree of public participation in cost-benefit analysis conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12044, particularly since

the Order has been construed not to provide a private cause of action permitting citizens and
regulated interests to intervene in the "Regulatory Analysis" process. See note 151 supra.
219. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See text accompanying notes
69-71 supra.
220. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See
text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
221. See Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975), for possible
distinctions between NEPA and Atomic Energy Act cost-benefit analyses. See also York

Comm. for a Safe Environment v. NRC, 527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Acknowledgement of Cost-Benefit Analysis Limitations

Agencies frequently fail to discuss important methodological issues of cost-benefit analysis in their published decisionmaking record
either because the full -background of their cost-benefit analyses is not
part of the record, or because key assumptions are made without public
comment or congressional oversight hearings. 222 After Crowther v. Seaborg,223 NRC developed its cost-benefit analysis approach more fully
than any other regulatory body. For example, the valuation of human
life set by NRC for use in its cost-benefit analyses to establish reactor
radiation emission controls requirements is $1000 per whole-body rem
and $1000 per thyroid rem. 224 Originally, this monetization of human
life was set forth as an interim standard with the promise of subsequent
hearings. Nevertheless, NRC recently announced its decision "not to
conduct a hearing to refine or reduce the health cost figures previously
adopted. ' 225 The use of an "interim" valuation for a highly critical
variable, without public hearing, is inconsistent with the politically responsive criteria for setting agency standards required by Crowther v.
26
Seaborg.2
Under current licensing regulations 227 NRC requires an applicant
for a reactor permit to demonstrate (1) that the plant is cost-effective in
light of governing economic, social, and environmental factors, and (2)
that overall benefits outweigh aggregated costs. 228 This review of alternatives seldom involves only commensurable factors. Especially problematic is the evaluation of alternative sites since it is unclear how
NRC should value and compare unquantifiable environmental assets
such as wetlands and unique ecosystems that differ from site to site.
Evaluation is further complicated because changes in population
density around a plant during its operational life may affect its "cost"
222.

Most agencies subject to Executive Order 12044 published proposed regulations for

conducting "Regulatory Analyses." See note 172 supra. Review of the proposed regulations
reveals that often the agencies did little more than restate the general requirements of the
Order itself. See, e.g., the proposed regulations of CPSC, 43 Fed. Reg. 32,392 (1978) and the
Department of Energy, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,634 (1978). But see EPA's proposed regulations, 43
Fed. Reg. 29,891 (1978).
223. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
224. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 app. 1 (1979).
225. 43 Fed. Reg. 22,253 (1978).
226. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.

Other features of NRC's cost-benefit analyses may be called into question as well. For example, Appendix I of the regulation, 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 app. 1 (1979), provides no guidance on

evaluating human mutagenic effects and other impacts on the lives of future generations and
their environments.
227. 10 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1979). An applicant's environmental report must include a costbenefit analysis which quantifies factors "to the fullest extent practicable." Id § 51.20(b).
The NRC draft environmental impact statement likewise must contain a preliminary costbenefit analysis. See id § 51.23(c).

228.

Interview with NRC staff in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
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in terms of radiation exposure and attendant health effects. NRC's discretion in considering population growth when approving a plant site
has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, provided the agency develops a "reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation"
on this issue. 229 Nevertheless, NRC lacks standards for incorporating
distributional considerations into cost-benefit based licensing determinations despite radiation's greater impact on persons living near the
plant or those particularly susceptible to radiation, such as children and
pregnant women.
In addition, NRC use of cost-benefit analysis is inconsistent. Plant
safety features, such as the emergency core cooling system, are not subject to cost-benefit analysis in the rulemaking and plant permit review
processes because NRC believes costs cannot be considered when
safety is an issue. 230 There is no rational distinction, however, between
safety features designed to prevent accidents and operational features
intended to minimize the leakage of radioactive effluents. Since both
"safety" and "operational" constraints reduce the possibility of radiation damage to humans and the environment, it is unclear why the latter should be regularly subject to cost-benefit based rulemaking, while
the former are not. Perhaps this dichotomy reflects a reluctance to consider high-cost, low probability events; structural failures and resulting
large-scale catastrophes could tilt the cost-benefit analysis against the
23
intended agency action. '
By comparison, EPA engages in cost-benefit analysis to some extent under several statutes and programs involving air, water, radiation,
pesticides, and toxic chemicals, but without the methodological coherence or thoroughness of NRC. 23 2 For example, EPA analysis leading
229. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Isaak Walton League of
America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 14 (1975).
230. Interview with Robert Minogue, NRC Standards Division, in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 1977).
231. Regulation of licensee activities is subject to NRC's "Value Impact Guidelines."
This approach calls for sequential consideration of four questions: (I) the problem to be
addressed by new regulation; (2) upper level constraints already established or to be established by NRC or other agencies; (3) alternative methods of reaching such objectives; and
(4) the value and impact of each alternative. These guidelines recommend no particular
analytical technique for the fourth step, but permit the use of cost-benefit analysis or, where
goals are already established, cost-effectiveness analysis, as a method of choosing among
alternative regulatory constraints. See Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Memorandum entitled "SD Staff Guidance for Preparation of
Value/Impact Statements" (Apr. 11, 1977).
Although the guidelines supply a valuable framework for structuring NRC decisions,
they do not address the quantification issue, the discount rate, or other particular problems
of using cost-benefit analysis in setting standards. Moreover, their precise scope and applicability are difficult to determine because it is unclear how to draw the line between reactor
licensee activities that relate to safety and those that do not.
232. See discussion of NRC and EPA in Brookhaven Report, supra note 17, at 30-134.
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to its environmental radiation standards for the uranium fuel cycle 233
involved two critical findings, one technical, the other decidedly nontechnical. First, EPA analysts compared the costs of radiation control
to the number of adverse health effects avoided at each level of control.
They found that beyond the point where potential adverse health effects would be reduced at the rate of one life per $500,000, further life
saving benefits would require large additional expenditures. 234 Second,
EPA justified selecting a standard based on this breakpoint in the costbenefit curve because it felt the acceptable cost of saving an unspecified
human life should not exceed $500,000.235
Cynics might claim that EPA based its standard on NRC determinations of what controls the nuclear power industry could afford. In
other words, EPA set a generous environmental standard to accommodate the maximum releases tolerable under NRC's site-specific reactor
emission standards and to accommodate the potential number of reactors planned at any single site. 236 Improving the quality of an agency's
cost-benefit analyses cannot directly control the impact of this
prodevelopmental bias. More responsible cost-benefit analyses, however, would allow the public to see that such factors do affect agency
decisionmaking.
The question remains whether a federal administrative agency
alone should make these decisions about critical methodological
problems. Although analysis carried out under NEPA is open to public
scrutiny, the potentially controversial valuation of human life justifying
the ambient radiation standard did not attract public or congressional
comment, perhaps because the EIS did not clearly distinguish EPA's
objective measurement of risk from its subjective determination of a
socially acceptable risk based on life-saving cost estimates. Yet an
agency's obligation to articulate its assumptions should be greatest
when its cost-benefit analysis includes such politically sensitive ele237
ments as a monetary value for human life.
233.

OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NORMAL OPERATIONS OF
ACTIVITIES IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT

(Nov. 1, 1976) (EPA Rep. No. 520/4-76-016).
234. Id at 48.
235. Id at 51; interview with Dr. William Rowe, Director of the Office of Radiation
Programs, EPA, in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978).
236. NRC believes up to five reactors can be sited together, provided each operates efficiently-limiting its offsite emissions to five millirems per reactor, or a 25 millirems total for
the cluster of reactors. Interviews with NRC staff in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978). The
EPA ambient standard established in its separate regulatory proceeding is also 25 millirems,
either a remarkable coincidence or a planned harmonization of results.
237. For several EPA proposals addressing these problems, see 43 Fed. Reg. 47,001
(1978). The planned initiatives include publication of regulatory analyses, promotion of
citizen participation, and reimbursement for public participation.
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C. Development of Public Access 'Regulatory Analysis" Under
Executive Order
It is uncertain whether cost-benefit analyses and related documents prepared in response to Executive orders are subject to timely
238
public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The courts could conclude that OMB, COWPS, or RARG is an
"agency" and therefore subject to the Act under the Soucie v. David
test. 2 39 In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the President's Office of Science and Technology was an "agency," and not
merely part of the President's staff, because it independently evaluated
the scientific research programs of several federal agencies and pub240
lished notices in the Federal Register.
Even if OMB, for example, is an agency within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and hence FOIA, specific FOIA exemptions may prevent public disclosure of "Regulatory Analysis" documents. One exemption prevents disclosure of "inter-agency or intraagency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."' 24 1 This exemption protects internal communication reflecting deliberative or
policymaking processes, but not purely factual material. Agency costbenefit analyses, background documents, and related OMB, COWPS,
242
and RARG evaluations may fall within this exemption.
Congress and the public may find other means of gaining access to
Regulatory Analysis materials. Administrative Procedure Act provisions restricting an agency's right to take "official notice" of matters
outside the decisionmaking record 243 and prohibiting ex parte commu244
nication during formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings
may force disclosure of some documents. Furthermore, new legislation
could require greater openness in presidential management of federal
regulation through the Regulatory Analysis device. 245 An example of
this kind of congressional intervention is the Congressional Budget and
238. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
239. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
240. Id. at 1075. These are among the major distinguishing characteristics of OSTP
considered by the court. During consideration of the executive reorganization plan creating
OSTP, its status was specifically likened to that of the Budget Bureau, the predecessor of
OMB. Id at 1074.
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
242. The Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West 1977), presents similar issues concerning publicly held deliberative meetings, availability of transcripts, and judicial review. See
Administrative Conference of the United States, An Interpretive Guide to the Government
in the Sunshine Act (1978). RARG meetings are closed to the public.
243. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1976).
244. Id § 557(d)(1)(C) (1976). See note 203 supra.
245. See S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which provides for agency publication of
and public comment on initial regulatory analyses, as well as publication of final regulatory
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Impoundment Control Act of 1974,246 which restricted the President's
right to impound funds and thereby curtail the scope of programs authorized by Congress. Similarly, Congress might not tolerate the modification of legislatively mandated regulatory programs through
RARG's or OMB's imposition of additional nonstatutory criteria relating to inflationary impact and other "costs" of regulation.247
Finally, Executive Order 12044 requires agencies to publish proposed regulations for implementing the Order in the Federal Register
and to give the public an early and meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of subsequent agency regulations. 248 The Order, however, permits each agency flexibility in choosing the most
effective method for increasing public participation. 249 To transform
these vague directives into meaningful public participation, OMB and
RARG should review agency practice and formulate more detailed
guidelines. In addition, agencies should take independent steps to open
their activities to timely public review under Executive Order 12044.250
D.

Timing of Cost-Beneft Analysis in Decisionmaking

Agencies frequently conduct cost-benefit analysis after making
regulatory decisions on other grounds. Agencies can take administrative action subject to NEPA only after publishing the final EIS, which
may include cost-benefit analysis, and allowing a suitable time period
for public comment. Cost-benefit analysis under enabling statutes or
other authority, however, generally is not subject to similar timing provisions. Analysts at several agencies believe that their agencies often
analyses. Regulatory analysis itself, however, is excluded from judicial review. See note 208
supra.

246. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 332 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407 (1976)).
247. See text accompanying notes 177-83 supra.
248. 3 C.F.R. 153 (1978 Compilation). The order requires publishing an advance notice
of proposed rulemaking, holding open conferences or public meetings, and providing the
public at least 60 days to comment on proposed significant regulations. Id In giving notice
of proposed rules, each agency is directed to inform the public on how to obtain any draft
regulatory analyses that may have been developed. Id at 155.
249. Id at 153.
250. Under Executive Order 12044, agencies now publish proposed and final regulations
and issue regulatory reform agendas providing general assurances as to the timely availability of regulatory analyses and public participation. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 47,005 (1978).
Furthermore, published guidelines from OMB to the agencies and from CEA to RARG,
require filing regulatory analyses for public availability and prior notice of public availability of draft regulatory analyses when the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.
These general assurances, however, are ineffective in practice. For example, CPSC's
final standard for power lawn mowers, 44 Fed. Reg. 9990 (1979), mentions the balancing
that CPSC conducted between the need to reduce risks and possible adverse economic effects, but refers the reader to a Battelle Institute analysis of the economic costs, not included
in the Federal Register entry. The Battelle report is an ad hoc analysis. Such references to
ad hoc economic analyses, without provision of generic guidelines and justifications for the
arbitrary elements of such analyses, do not adequately inform interested parties.
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use cost-benefit analysis to "document" decisions already reached. 25'
Such post hoc uses of cost-benefit analysis raise questions about the
good faith objectivity of agencies in reaching regulatory decisions.
The timing of cost-benefit analysis often determines whether the
technique is confined to its proper role in the decisionmaking process.
In dealing with a regulatory problem involving technical uncertainty,
risks, and control options based on scanty information, agencies normally undertake three tasks: (1) measurement of the risk; (2) identification of control options; and (3) determination of the level of risk
acceptable to affected interests. The first and second tasks are primarily objective determinations that should not be "contaminated" by
the technical expert's assumptions about the proper level of costs to
impose on a regulated industry or the proper distribution of costs
across different sectors of society. The third task, on the other hand,
involves consideration of legal, economic, and social factors tradeoffs.
Subjective valuation of costs and benefits through cost-benefit analysis
may be appropriate here because the third task is carried out in the
"sunshine," as required by administrative law. Agencies frequently fail
to keep these functions distinct, polluting technical objectivity with
unarticulated cost and other nontechnical factors. New regulatory procedures could prevent confusion of these functions by prohibiting the
use of cost-benefit analyses until after technical measurement of risks
2 52
and identification of control options have taken place.
VI
CONCLUSION

Three broad conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, costbenefit analysis is an inappropriate tool for regulatory decisionmaking
on health, safety, and environmental problems. It should be replaced
by the judicious use of cost-effectiveness analysis. Second, if cost-benefit analysis is to be used, and indeed increasingly used because of Executive pressures, several constitutional and public policy issues should
be aired in order to ensure that the public and Congress approve of the
transformation of regulatory decisionmaking from judgmental and
qualitative balancing to economic and monetized balancing. Third, if
neither the first nor second conclusion and the concerns they reflect are
25 1. Conclusion based on interviews with NRC, EPA, ERDA, and FEA staffs in Washington, D.C. (Fall 1978), in preparation of the Brookhaven Report, note 17 supra.
252. Timing alone does not determine the weight of cost-benefit analysis in the decision-

making process. When several different regulatory alternatives have favorable benefit-tocost ratios, the agency must decide whether to follow the most favorable course of action.

For example, NRC may select any site with a favorable cost-benefit ratio as long as no
"obviously superior site" exists. In re Public Serv. Co., 5 NRC 503, 527-30 (1979).

As a

practical matter, NRC's use of cost-benefit analysis enables it to affirm the licensee's proposed site in virtually every case.
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likely to be acted upon, society will have to "make do" with a set of
incremental reforms in congressional, executive, and agency procedures.
A.

Cost-Benefit Analysis v. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is an unacceptable basis for governmental
decisionmaking on persistent health, safety, and environmental
problems. It is a simplistic tool that reduces concern for the individual
to a monetized balancing. Worse, it has become a self-serving numbers
game obscuring arbitrary and subjective values and assumptions, while
impeding real progress toward our espoused health, safety, and environmental objectives.
Solutions to societal problems, such as nuclear reactor safety and
human exposure to chemical carcinogens, require consideration of humanistic and environmental principles. Consideration of these principles is incompatible with a regulatory decisionmaking process in which
economic factors play a dominant role.
At present, the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts promote health
and welfare considerations over industrial costs in setting standards
and requiring regulatory decisions to be based on the "best available
technology." By acknowledging that these principles are primary in
most health, safety, and environmental areas, regulatory agencies could
(1) establish health and safety goals on the basis of objective estimates
and acceptable levels of risk arrived at in open proceedings; (2) identify
the best available methods for achieving these goals; and (3) choose
among alternative methods of achieving these objectives through costeffectiveness analysis, the traditional analytical method of finding the
least costly path to a goal.
This approach confines economic concerns to their proper role as
one of several criteria for choosing a method for solving a societal
problem. Cost-effectiveness analysis helps to determine the means, in
contrast to cost-benefit analysis, which uses a quantitative approach to
determine both the ends and means. Most significantly, the executive
branch and agencies can adopt the cost-effectiveness alternative under
most existing statutory schemes.
B.

Constitutionaland Ethical Issues

The use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory decisionmaking
process also presents issues that transcend administrative law and procedure. For example, maintenance of the proper separation of powers
in light of the ambitious regulatory reforms proposed by the Office of
the President raises a significant constitutional issue. If the balancing
function, now delegated to the agencies, is conducted by the Office of
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the President, off the record and insulated from judicial review, power
shifts from Congress to the Executive. This and other constitutional
isues, which are beyond the scope of this Article, require vigorous discussion.
The use of cost-benefit analysis also raises important questions of
professional ethics and responsibility for the economists and other analysts involved. It is irresponsible for such analysts to make arbitrary
assumptions on issues which lie beyond their or anyone else's expertise.
Decisions on the valuation of human life or environmental quality, the
discount rate, and distribution of costs and benefits across society, are
not properly dealt with by unaccountable analysts, but should be made
by those vested with the responsibility to make these subjective choices.
Congress and other publicly accountable officials must make these critical choices if cost-benefit analysis is to be employed responsibly.
The use of cost-benefit analysis also raises larger ethical questions.
Our constitutional framework for governmental decisionmaking involves balancing many factors. It does not mandate the use of an economic framework, and indeed establishes a framework for
decisionmaking which ensures that no single factor such as economics
will dominate. The varied and often conflicting needs and desires of
many segments of our society must be weighed against fundamental
individual rights in order to establish ultimate societal values and reach
an optimal governmental choice. This process is subverted when costbenefit analysis is the basis of decisionmaking. An economic framework for making societal choices stresses only factors that are monetizable over a short period of time. Therefore, the use of cost-benefit
analysis to determine our policies on such issues as radioactive waste
disposal or access for the handicapped to public transportation systems
inevitably leads to different results than those obtained by an analysis
emphasizing long-term needs or individual welfare.
Public recognition of the ethical implications of governmental
adoption of an economic framework for decisionmaking has been woefully insufficient. Responsibility for articulating public values lies with
Congress. In light of the critical long-term consequences of cost-benefit
analysis decisionmaking, meaningful and decisive congressional action
is a necessity.
C. Reforming Present Cost-Beneft Analysis Practicesto Promote
Accountability
Rejection of cost-benefit analysis as a primary basis for regulatory
decisionmaking and recognition of its functional, constitutional, and
ethical limitations must occur eventually. Our political institutions,
however, may not be ready to take these steps. Until meaningful
change in the structural framework for decisionmaking occurs, some
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pragmatic, if limited steps can now be taken to promote greater accountability and reduce critical problems presented by agency uses of
cost-benefit analysis.
When properly applied, cost-benefit analysis can be a useful tool
in the regulatory decisionmaking process. When used objectively, in
good faith, and with requisite analytical rigor, cost-benefit analysis provides a framework for the rational organization of multiple considerations. Determinations made from properly organized opinions and
information can represent a logical process, which in turn promotes
agency credibility and acceptance of agency decisions. Furthermore,
cost-benefit analysis promotes the use of a consistent and predictable
analytical structure for organizing data and opinions on the numerous
issues involved in a proposed regulatory action. Clear articulation of
each element of the decisionmaking process enhances fairness and increases agency accountability. Cost-benefit analysis also offers decisionmakers a simple method for reaching decisions in the
multiobjective, pluralistic value context in which most agencies operate. Despite its potential values, however, actual cost-benefit analysis
practices demonstrate significant methodological, substantive, and institutional limitations. Methodological problems, including valuation
of attributes, choice of discount rates, and distribution of effects, have
always beset cost-benefit analysis. The substantive issues stem, in part,
from the methodological limitations. Monetization of environmental
and health amenities constitutes an inappropriate treatment of factors
that transcend economics. Moreover, cost-benefit analysis often is insensitive to specific distributional implications of alternative decisions,
thereby conflicting with constitutional concepts of equal protection.
Critical elements of cost-benefit decisionmaking, such as the selection
of data on measurements of risks and benefits, the development and
application of discount rates, and the choice of analytical methods to
read the data, are subjectively based determinations. The source of the
data is often the clearly self-interested company or technocrat. These
subjective determinations must be publicly tested and openly verified
before their adoption in cost-benefit analysis.
Agency use of cost-benefit analysis also raises a number of major
institutional issues. Agencies such as NRC and EPA have failed to
coordinate analytical approaches to shared problems, such as radiation,
and to adopt common values for health effects and environmental attributes. Nor have EIS and regulatory analyses been coordinated.
CEQ has been silent on how agencies should conduct NEPA balancing
analyses while COWPS and OMB have played increasingly significant
but undefined roles in regulatory decisionmaking. Practical difficulties
make meaningful public participation and timely access to information
and 'deliberative meetings a problem. Furthermore, the timing of a
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cost-benefit analysis often determines its actual influence on decisionmaking: if done late in the game, it may do no more than provide a
post hoc rationale for a decision reached on other grounds.
Appropriate use of cost-benefit analysis in decisionmaking lies at
the heart of new regulatory programs for protecting health, safety, and
environmental quality. This is because each agency usually must reconcile multiple, frequently conflicting, statutory objectives and must
follow specific statutory and Presidential requirements to conduct economic analyses. The increasing use of cost-benefit analysis reflects the
administrative response to this growing need for a balancing or tradeoff
process as the analytical foundation for agency decisions.
Given the conflicting demands of the escalating public outcry to
render administrative agencies more accountable, statutorily or presidentially mandated balancing analyses, and the inherent problems
presented by cost-benefit analysis, Congress, the Executive, and the
agencies each must take steps to promote more responsible use of costbenefit analysis in regulatory decisionmaking. The intent of the reforms discussed below is neither to foster nor exclude the use of costbenefit analysis and other balancing analyses, nor to provide guidance
as to when cost-benefit analysis should be used. Their purpose is to
ensure that (1) cost-benefit analysis be responsibly employed whenever
it is used, and that (2) the proposed reforms are implemented whenever
regulatory agency balancing analyses are mandated.
1

StrategiesforCongressionalReforms

Congress should conduct a comprehensive review of agency implementation of major health, safety, and environmental legislation to
determine the extent to which agency uses of cost-benefit analysis or
other balancing techniques are consistent with statutory objectives and
sound administrative practice. The review should also identify conflicts bewteen Executive Order 12044 as implemented and statutory requirements that prevent the agencies from acting consistently with
congressional objectives.
Congress should also conduct a special review of agency implementation of NEPA's requirements for "balancing analysis" and other
methodological requirements of section 102(2). Congress should then
provide clearer guidance to the agencies by amending NEPA to
achieve the following:
- Clarification of NEPA's applicability to agency rulemaking;
- Coordination of NEPA implementation procedures with the procedural requirements of Executive Order 12044;
- Clarification of the extent to which NEPA's impact assessment mandate requires quantification of the elements of a subsequent balancing analysis, the methodology for such quantification, and the
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discount rate to be used for estimating the future impacts of agency
action subject to NEPA; and
- Clarification as to whether agencies are required by NEPA to choose
the best alternative resulting from the balancing analysis.
Congress, in future health, safety, and environmental legislation,
should articulate more precisely the factors that federal agencies should
consider in reaching decisions and furnish the "intelligible principles"
necessary for agencies to meet the multiple objectives required by such
legislation. Congress should state expressly when an agency should
and should not use a cost-benefit approach and provide guidance as to
how it is to be meaningfully integrated with Executive Order 12044
requirements. If Congress decides to promote a cost-benefit or other
balancing analysis approach to regulatory decisionmaking, it should
oversee the critical methodological issues such as valuation of intangible costs and benefits, use of discount rates, and distribution of effects.
Whether Congress provides guidelines on each of these issues or
delegates that authority with guidance to an appropriate interagency
body for resolution, the essentially nontechnical, subjective nature of
these methodological issues must be recognized.
2. Strategiesfor Reforms in the Office of the President
The Office of the President should issue an Executive order
amending Executive Order 12044 to provide further guidance to
RARG, COWPS, OMB, and CEA in order to ensure that they implement Executive Order 12044 consistently with legislative requirements
on health, safety, and environmental quality. The amended Order
should enlarge the membership of RARG to include agency and nongovernmental personnel representing the legally protected health,
safety, and environmental interests at stake in the Regulatory Analysis
process. The new Order should require RARG and the other Presidential offices to function in open proceedings, provide full public access to
the information they use, and, in conjunction with the agencies under
review, follow all requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Furthermore, the Order should provide that all RARG proceedings
and materials germane to any agency's final regulatory action be incorporated in the agency record of decision, available for public, congressional and judicial review.
Finally, the Order should direct RARG to make public findings on
several key considerations in its review of any proposed agency action
under Executive Order 12044:
-Authority for agency use of cost-benefit analysis or other balancing
analyses;
-Particular methods of analysis selected by RARG or the agency, and
attributes of such methods that conflict with governing legislation;
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-RARG and agency methods for considering unquantifiable elements
of the analyses, discounting future costs and benefits, evaluating distributional considerations, and other methodological problems;
-Timing of cost-benefit or other analysis vis-a-vis actual agency deci-

sionmaking;
-Weight accorded to cost-benefit or other analysis in actual agency
decisionmaking;
-Due process and Administrative Procedure Act safeguards developed

by agencies in cost-benefit or other balancing analysis proceedings,
including articulation of procedures through regulations, public notices, opportunities for affected interests to contest agency and
RARG analyses before agency action, and restrictions on ex parte
communications; and
-Public participation in agency cost-benefit analysis or other analyses
and opportunity for review.

3. Strategiesfor Reforms in All Regulatory Agencies
Each regulatory agency using cost-benefit or other balancing analyses in making decisions should promulgate a generic regulation
describing its use of these analytical tools in order to promote clear and
consistent regulatory policy furthering the legislative and executive requirements under which the agency operates. The regulation should
address the sources of agency authority to conduct balancing analyses,
the particular analytical method selected by the agency and any conflicts with the applicable governing legislation, methodological limitations of the selected analytical approach and how they are addressed,
safeguards,
the timing and weight afforded the analyses, due process
253
and public participation and opportunity for review.
253. The author included these suggestions in a report to the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS), note 135 supra, which formed the basis of this Article. The
ACUS adopted a recommendation based in part on this report for improvement of agency
cost-benefit practices at its semi-annual plenary session in June 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg.
38,817-26 (1979) (to be codified in I C.F.R. pt. 305):
§ 305.79-4 Public disclosure concerning the use of cost-benefit and similar analyses
in regulation (recommendation No. 79-4).
(a) Federal agencies must frequently weigh competing health, safety, resource management, environmental, economic, and other societal interests when
seeking to achieve a prescribed statutory objective. Wise decisionmaking presupposes that the potential benefits and costs of the actions under consideration will be
identified, will be quantified if feasible, and will be appraised in relation to each
other. To give structure to the exercise of this responsibility, agencies sometimes
use "cost-benefit" or similar analytic approaches to organize available information
to determine the consequences of possible courses of action in terms of their costs,
risks and benefits. Such techniques seek to display the projected net effects of alternative courses of action and, when properly used, can assist the decisionmaker
in deciding which of the alternatives is most likely to produce a desired result.
(b) The following recommendation seeks to promote openness in the decision-making process, to ensure that agencies' analytic methods are sound and that
their assumptions are known, so as to enhance public confidence in the soundness
of conclusions finally reached. The recommendation is not intended to promote or
to discourage the use of any single kind of analysis as a framework for agency
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In addition, for decisionmaking conducted pursuant to the
promulgated regulation, each agency should:
-At the time of public notice of proposed rulemaking or the initiation
of licensing or other regulatory proceedings, make publicly available
its preliminary findings on such key considerations relating to the
intended regulatory action and describe fully any actual balancing
conducted; and
-At the time of final regulatory action, and thereafter, include in the
decision record any revised findings on these key considerations.
The public must be fully informed about the information and assumpdecision-making, since this choice is normally a matter of agency discretion. The
choice of analytic technique may depend on several factors, including the technical
complexity of the problem, the magnitude of the impacts, the time frame for
agency action, and the extent to which quantification is possible for the specific
costs and benefits to be considered. Any analysis, of course, should be viewed as
an aid to rational decision-making, and not as an end in itself. The intent of the
recommendation will be served by giving the public adequate advance notice of
the agency's proposed methodologies, either generically or by means of special notice in a particular proceeding.
Recommendation
1. Agencies, as general policy though not necessarily by binding rule should
adopt the practice of addressing, in their public notices of particular proceedings in
which cost-benefit or similar analyses are to be used, the following points:
a. Any statutory or other legal requirements pertaining to or affecting the
agency's conduct of cost-benefit or similar analyses in the proceeding.
b. The particular analytic technique to be followed by the agency (e.g., costbenefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, qualitative or non-numerative balancing), with a description of the method, including an identification of any analytic
models preliminarily determined to be used.
c. Any factual assumptions or preliminary findings of the agency to be utilized in the analyses.
d. The agency's techniques for assessing and revealing uncertainties in its
quantitative estimates, and making explicit the range of error associated with particular quantitative estimates.
e. The agency's methods for evaluating intangible costs and benefits, for discounting future costs and benefits, and for taking account of distributional effects
arising under the selected methodology, to the extent such issues are involved in
the analyses.
f. The stages of the proceeding at which the cost-benefit or similar analyses
will be conducted and the results considered.
g. The extent and nature of public participation in the design, conduct, and
evaluation of the cost-benefit or similar analyses.
h. The extent and manner in which the public is to be accorded access to
assumptions and information used in the analyses.
A statement of the weight given the cost-benefit or similar analyses, and a description of any revisions of assumptions or preliminary findings, should be included in
the final agency determination and made available to the public.
2. Where a pattern of recurring decisional problems exists for which a particular analytic technique is appropriate, the agency should consider adopting aneric regulation or policy statement describing the use of that technique with
respect to those problems. Agencies that have varied statutory functions may suitably formulate separate regulations or policy statements for different areas of statutory responsibility. Generic regulations or policy statements so adopted may
permit the use of different techniques on an ad hoc basis where the agency determines that to be necessary. Any such regulations or policy statements should address the points listed in paragraph I.
Id at 38,826.
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tions that form the basis of agency action, their sources, and reasons for
departing from the provisions of the generic regulation.
D. A Final Perspective
The cost-benefit techniques used today are the analytical descendants of Jeremy Bentham's proposals for reforming legal decisionmaking through the use of "felicific calculus." 25 4 Much of the philosophical
and humanistic criticism of the Bentham approach remains valid today
and is reinforced by constitutional principles that reflect a more holistic
approach to governance in a pluralistic society and limit the uses of
economic analysis in decisionmaking. In essence, the Constitution does
not require that governmental decisionmaking be premised on simplistic economic analyses.
Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made that providing the
greatest good for the greatest number remains one of the essential purposes of government, and that cost-benefit analysis represents a potentially workable method to reach this objective. The Executive and its
agencies have the responsibility to manage the federal enterprise rationally in order to achieve optimal use of our limited resources and
optimal protection of our diverse interests. If cost-benefit analysis continues as a basis for regulatory agency decisionmaking, it must be accompanied by meaningful public participation, diligent congressional,
executive, and judicial supervision, and agency "best efforts" to structure their discretion to meet the issues presented by this economic approach to the problems of health, safety, and environmental protection.

254.

Seegeneraly BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (B. Parekh ed. 1973). See in partic-

ular ch. 5, "Of the Principle of Utility."

